Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign Companies: A Step to Even the Odds in International Trade by Gevurtz, Franklin A.
University of the Pacific
Scholarly Commons
McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship
1987
Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas
Bribery by Foreign Companies: A Step to Even the
Odds in International Trade
Franklin A. Gevurtz
Pacific McGeorge School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/facultyarticles
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the International Trade Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the McGeorge School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in McGeorge School of Law Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information,
please contact mgibney@pacific.edu.
Recommended Citation
Franklin A. Gevurtz, Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat Overseas Bribery by Foreign Companies: A Step to Even the Odds in
International Trade, 27 Va. J. Int'l L. 211 (1987).
Using the Antitrust Laws to Combat 
Overseas Bribery by Foreign 
Companies: A Step to Even the Odds 
in International Trade 
FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ* 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Incidents of illegal payments1 combined with a move to weaken 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act2 (FCP A) have sparked renewed 
• Associate Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific. J.D., 
University of California, Berkeley; B.S., University of California at Los Angeles. 
1. In July 1986, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged Ashland Oil, 
Inc. with illegally paying $28.7 million to an official in Oman to obtain crude oil in 1980. At 
the same time, a federal grand jury began investigating commissions paid by Westinghouse 
Electric Corp. (allegedly amounting up to millions of dollars) to win a nuclear plant contract 
in the Philippines. Wall St. J., July 10, 1986, at 54, col. 1. 
2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA), Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1494 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a note, 78m(b), 78dd-l, 78dd-2, 78ff(a) (1982 & 
Supp. III 1985)). In the 99th Congress, the business community and the Reagan administra-
tion supported S. 430, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. S1299 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985), a 
bill sponsored by Senator John Heinz which would have reduced the FCPA's recordkeeping 
requirements. See Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hear-
ings on S. 430 Before the Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy and the 
Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1986) [hereinafter Joint 1986 Hearing] (prepared statement of Secretary 
of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige). In addition, the House of Representatives on May 22, 1986 
passed H.R. 4800, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. H3025 (daily ed. May 21, 1986) (as 
amended), an omnibus trade bill which included a provision narrowing liability under the 
FCPA if money is paid to an agent who uses it to make a bribe. 132 Cong. Rec. H3225 (daily 
ed. May 22, 1986); see also Wall St. J., July 10, 1986, at 54, col. 1 (noting comments of the 
sponsors of the House bill). The possibility of incurring liability through an agent's unau-
thorized bribery of a foreign official has raised significant concern among U.S. corporations 
abroad. Joint 1986 Hearing, supra, at 134 (response by Secretary Baldrige to written ques-
tions of Senator Heinz). 
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debate over the United States response to overseas bribery. This 
debate invariably centers on regulation of corrupt acts committed 
by U.S. citizens.3 Curiously, little attention is given to the impact 
that corrupt practices by other nationals have on U.S. companies 
doing business abroad. This Article will explore how U.S. firms 
may be protected from losing business opportunities abroad due to 
bribes made by foreign companies. 
Traditionally, only the nation whose official received an illegal 
payment or the nation in which the bribe occurred imposed sanc-
tions on the briber.• Often, however, nations do not effectively en-
3. Among the considerable body of literature exploring responses to overseas bribery by 
U.S. nationals, see Ad Hoc Comm. on Foreign Payments, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of 
New York, Report on Questionable Foreign Payments by Corporations: The Problem and 
Approaches to a Solution (1977); G. Greanes & D. Windsor, The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: Anatomy of a Statute (1982); Herlihy & Levine, Corporate Crisis: The Overseas Pay-
ment Problem, 8 Law & Pol. Int'l Bus. 547 (1976); Lashbrooke, The Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 1977: A Unilateral Solution to an International Problem, 12 Cornell Int'l L.J. 
227 (1979); McLaughlin, The Criminalization of Questionable Foreign Payments by Corpo-
rations: A Comparative Legal Systems Analysis, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1071 (1978); McManis, 
Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: An Antitrust Approach, 86 Yale L.J. 215 (1976); 
Rill & Frank, Antitrust Consequences of United States Corporate Payments to Foreign Offi-
cials: Applicability of Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act and Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 30 Vand. L. Rev. 131 (1977); Roiter, Illegal Corporate Practices and the Dis-
closure Requirements of Federal Securities Laws, 50 Fordham L. Rev. 781 (1982); Wither-
spoon, Multinational Corporations-Governmental Regulation of Business Ethics Under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: An Analysis, 87 Dick. L. Rev. 531 (1983); Wolf, Im-
proper Foreign Corporate Payments: An Analysis of the Problem and Its Solutions, 2 Suf-
folk Transnat'l L.J. 43 (1978). 
4. Virtually every nation treats bribery of its officials as a crime. J. Noonan, Bribes 702 
(1984); Driscoll, The Illegality of Bribery: Its Roots, Essence and Universality, 14 Cap. U.L. 
Rev. 1, 13-38 (1984); Note, Prohibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal Sanctions for Corporate 
Payments Abroad, 10 Cornell Int'l L.J . 231 , 235 & n.26 (1977); see also Goldstein, European 
Views of United States Anti-Bribery and Anti-Boycott Legislation, 1 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 
363 (1979) (every major European nation prohibits bribery of its officials); Suse, Questiona-
ble Payments in the Middle East: Potential Liability of American Corporations, 4 J . Comp. 
Corp. & Sec. Reg. 101 (1982) (examining anti-bribery laws of seventeen Middle Eastern 
nations). Somewhat less consensus exists with respect to bribing employees of private enter-
prises; i.e., commercial bribery. Many nations also treat this as a crime. See, e.g., The Pre-
vention of Corruption Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, ch. 34, amended by the Prevention of Corruption 
Act, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, ch. 64; Code penal arts. 177, 179 (Fr.); Gesetz gegen den unlauteren 
Wettbewerb § 12, 1909 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGBl] 499, 502 (as amended) (W. Ger.) (Act 
Against Unfair Competition); see generally 1 Pinner's World Unfair Competition Law, 
Topic No. 12, Bribery (H. Dawid 2d ed. 1978) (survey of foreign commercial bribery law). 
For a discussion of U.S. federal and state laws criminalizing commerical bribery, see Perrin 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 41-45 (1979). Even where such conduct is not criminal, it 
typically gives rise to civil liabilities. See generally H. Lidgard, C. Rohwer & D. Campbell, A 
Survey of Commercial Agency 32, 66, 126, 216, 434-35, 480-81 (1984). No nation other than 
the United States, however, prohibits bribery of another country's officials or bribery occur-
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force such domestic legislation. In 1977, the United States adopted 
a different approach.6 Congress enacted the FCPA to impose crimi-
nal liability on U.S. firms or nationals which use any means of in-
terstate commerce to further a bribe of a foreign official. The 
FCPA, however, is not the only sanction which the United States 
imposes on its nationals who pay bribes abroad; it is merely the 
most explicit. For example, the failure of public companies to dis-
close such payments in filings required by the Securities Act of 
19336 and the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 can lead to prose-
cution by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 8 Share-
holders may also bring suits alleging that corporate managers vio-
lated their fiduciary duty to the company under state law in 
making illegal payments.9 Moreover, unlike those of other coun-
tries/0 U.S. federal income tax laws do not allow a deduction for 
ring outside its territory. Noonan, supra, at 680; see also Goldstein, supra, at 364 (no west-
ern European nation has such a statutory prohibition). 
5. See generally Gevurtz, The United States Approach to Combating Bribery in the Inter-
national Sale of Goods, in Survey of the International Sale of Goods 333, 337-43 (1986) 
(discussing United States attempts to control bribery by U.S. corporations). 
6. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
77a·77aa (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). 
7. Securites Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 78a-78kk (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). For a further discussion of the interplay between U.S. 
securities laws and U.S. corporations' questionable practices abroad, see infra note 18. 
8. See, e.g., SEC v. Lockheed Corp., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 
1l 95,509 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1976) (consent judgment ordering, inter alia, that the corporation 
establish a special committee to investigate unlawful foreign political contributions, and en-
joining the corporation from future failures to report such payments to the SEC); SEC v. 
United Brands Co., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1l 95,420 (D.D.C. 
Jan. 27, 1976) (enjoining defendants from again failing to report to the SEC unlawful pay-
ments to foreign government officials). 
9. See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, 645 F.2d 761, 772-79 (9th Cir. 1981) (shareholders' suit 
concerning Lockheed's improper payments, which were used to boost sales abroad), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1982); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 731 (8th Cir. 1979) 
(shareholder sought recovery to corporation of penalties paid, on corporate officers' behalf, 
for illegal payments abroad), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Rosengarten v. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 820-22 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (questionable payments 
allegedly made to government officials and campaigns, both in the United States and 
abroad); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 509-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (shareholder alleged 
bribes were given to political parties in foreign countries); see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 
N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (bribery suit dismissed on other 
grounds); Steinberg v. Steinberg, 106 Misc. 2d 720, 434 N.Y.S.2d 877 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
1980) (complaint alleging breach of fiduciary duty in paying bribes dismissed upon finding 
of improper motives of plaintiff). 
10. See Lachat-Heritier, Commercial Bribes: The Swiss Answer, 5 J. Comp. Bus. & Cap. 
Mkt. L. 79, 94 (1983) (citing Swiss federal tax circular, Archives de droit fiscal 15, at 141 
(1946/1947)) (Switzerland allows a deduction under certain circumstances); Rubin, Interns-
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illegal overseas payments. 11 In addition, imaginative prosecutors 
have brought actions12 based upon violations of the mail and wire 
fraud statutes.13 Unreported transfers of funds abroad for purposes 
of making illegal payments violate the Bank Secrecy Act.14 Other 
statutes prohibit bribes when a sale involves U.S. foreign assis-
tance or arms exports. 111 
The net effect of these laws is that U.S. businesses face barriers 
to overseas bribery not faced by their foreign competitors and are 
thereby at a competitive disadvantage. 16 Removal of these barriers, 
tional Aspects of the Control of Illicit Payments, 9 Syracuse J. Int'l L. & Com. 315, 315 
(1982) (most developed countries allow a deduction); Note, Corruption and the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act of 1977, 13 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 158, 191 n.190 (1979) (West Germany 
allows a deduction). 
11. I.R.C. § 162(c)(l) (1982). By the terms of the statute, the deduction will be lost if the 
bribe to a foreign official falls within the prohibitions of the FCPA. Id. The regulations 
which accompany section 162{c)(l) define "foreign official" very broadly, encompassing, for 
example, even those who merely purport to be legitimate foreign officials. Treas. Reg. § 
1.162-18(a)(3) (as amended in 1975). 
Denying a tax deduction may be justified even if one disagrees with the criminalization of 
overseas bribery in the FCPA. It is one thing to say that enforcement of the laws against 
. bribery should be left to the country where it occurs, but quite another to suggest that the 
briber's country should appear to encourage the practice by allowing a corresponding tax 
deduction. It should be noted, however, that the impact of section 162(c)(l) of the Internal 
Revenue Code may go beyond simply depriving a firm of a deduction. Schedule Ml of Inter-
nal Revenue Service {IRS) Form 1120 requires a company to itemize those expenses re-
corded on its books for which it is not claiming a deduction. IRS Form 1120, U.S. Corpora-
tion Income Tax Return, 1986, reprinted in 3 Tax Action Coordinator (RIA) 733,011, 
733,014 (Dec. 1986). This may leave the company with the unpalatable choice between dis-
closing in an official document illegal conduct or, alternatively, claiming a deduction in vio-
lation of the tax Jaws. To make the dilemma more acute, IRS auditing procedures direct 
that corporate officers be asked whether their firms have made any illegal payments. 1 Int. 
Rev. Man.-Audit {CCH) 7294 {Jan. 1985) (Exhibit 900-1) (outlining questions to be asked 
corporate officers by IRS examiners). 
12. See, e.g., United States v. Control Data Corp., Criminal No. 78-210 (D.D.C filed Apr. 
26, 1978); United States v. The Williams Cos., Criminal No. 78-00144 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 24, 
1978). 
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1982). The theory posits that bribery constitutes a fraud 
upon the people of the corrupt official's nation. Thus, any use of mail or electronic commu-
nication in commerce to further the bribe violates the statutes. The result is a prohibition in 
some ways broader than the FCPA. 
14. Bank Secrecy Act § 231, 31 U.S.C. § 5316 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
15. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2381(b) (barring the distribution of foreign assistance funds to those 
found to have used bribery in connection with such funds), 2779(c) (United States govern-
ment will not, in relation to U.S. arms sales abroad, repay amounts spent on bribes) (1982). 
In contrast, French export insurance may actually allow government moneys to fund a 
bribe. Goldstein, supra note 4, at 364-65. 
16. Business Accounting and Foreign Trade Simplification Act: Joint Hearings on S. 708 
Before the Subcomm. on Securities and the Subcomm. on International Finance of the Sen-
ate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 98-103 (1981) 
19871 ANTITRUST 215 
however, is not a realistic or even desirable solution. The FCPA 
serves pragmatic foreign policy interests of the United States by 
seeking to ensure that U.S. companies, like Caesar's wife, remain 
above suspicion.17 Other laws impeding overseas bribery often re-
flect policies which require their application even if the United 
States does not have any direct interest in preventing its nationals 
from engaging in corrupt conduct. For example, disclosure require-
ments in the securities laws exist independent of any policy to de-
ter bribery: their purpose is to protect shareholders. If facts relat-
ing to bribery are material, 18 then shareholders must be informed 
irrespective of whether the United States wishes to prevent over-
seas bribery or, for that matter, to encourage it.19 
An alternative to eliminating laws regulating U.S. business prac-
tices is to impose added constraints on bribes made by foreign 
[hereinafter S. 708 Joint Hearings] (report submitted by the U.S. Dep't of State entitled 
"The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Reports from the Foreign Service") (discussing U.S. 
corporations' reluctance, in light of possible FCPA sanctions, to compete vigorously for for-
eign contracts as well as reports of contracts possibly lost due to bribery by foreign competi-
tors). But see Graham, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A New Perspective, J. Int'l Bus. 
Stud., Winter 1984, at 107 (arguing that the FCPA has had no negative impact overall on 
U.S. export performance or market share abroad), reprinted in Joint 1986 Hearing, supra 
note 2, at 23. 
17. Significantly, one of the principal rationales given by those countries (such as France) 
which prosecute their nationals for crimes committed abroad is that the crime injures the 
country's reputation. Blakesley, A Conceptual Framework for Extradition and Jurisdiction 
Over Extraterritorial Crime, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 685, 709. It is rather ironic that France does 
not prosecute its nationals for committing bribery abroad. 
18. A "material" fact is one to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
investor, in considering a specific security, would attach importance in determining either 
how to vote, TSC Indus. v . . Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976), or whether to purchase 
or sell the security. SEC Rule 405, 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (1986). Illegal payments may be 
considered "material" for several reasons. These include the penalties and reputational 
damage a company would likely suffer if its illegal payments became known, and the infer-
ences shareholders may draw from such practices concerning the quality of a company's 
product and the honesty of its management. Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., Report of the SEC on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Pay-
ments and Practices 29-31 (Comm. Print 1976), reprinted in Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 
353 Supp. (May 19, 1976). See SEC v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 829-30 
(E.D. Wis. 1978) (brewer faced, inter alia, possible license suspension because of questiona-
ble practices). But see United States v. Matthews, 787 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir. 1986) (corporate 
officer did not violate securities laws by failing to disclose on proxy statement that he was 
guilty of bribery that had not been prosecuted). 
19. While a disclosure requirement does not directly prohibit bribes, its ultimate effect 
will largely be the same. There will probably not be as many recipients for illegal payments 
if they know a report of the payment will appear in documents on public file or distributed 
to a large number of shareholders. In addition, the damage (including that to the company's 
reputation) which may render bribes material occurs once the bribe is disclosed. 
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firms. When Congress enacted the FCPA, it hoped that multilat-
eral treaties would follow under which other trading nations would 
pledge to join in prohibiting corrupt acts committed by their own 
nationals.20 Efforts to negotiate such treaties, however, have 
yielded little success.21 This is hardly surprising. If the United 
States is willing unilaterally to prohibit bribery by its nationals do-
ing business abroad, there is a disincentive for other trading na-
tions to agree to enforce similar prohibitions because this would 
take away a possible competitive edge for their firms. Thus, if the 
United States wants to even the odds in this one aspect of interna-
tional trade, it must do so by applying its own law. 
This Article will explore such a course of action. Given that the 
U.S. laws most concerned with preserving competition on the mer-
its are the antitrust laws, the question is whether those laws can 
apply to overseas bribery by foreign companies which prejudices 
U.S. firms. The inquiry is divided into three steps. Part II of this 
Article will consider whether bribery can violate the Sherman, 
Federal Trade Commission, and Robinson-Patman Acts. Part III 
will explore whether there is jurisdiction for these Acts to apply to 
overseas payoffs made by representatives of foreign firms. Finally, 
Part IV will describe the defenses which may be raised when for-
eign governments become involved in overseas bribery. 
II. BRIBERY AS A VIOLATION OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 
A. The Sherman Act 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act22 proscribes contracts, combina-
tions, and conspiracies in restraint of trade. 23 Thus, for a bribe to 
violate this section, there must first be a contract, combination, or 
conspiracy. A conspiracy clearly exists if two or more independent 
20. See, e.g., S. Res. 265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 Cong. Rec. 36107-08 (1975) (calling for 
the initiation of multilateral negotiations to establish an international system of antibribery 
rules and sanctions). 
21. See S. 708 Joint Hearings, supra note 16, at 61 (statement of Ambassador Brock) 
(noting the failure, over the span of several administrations, to attain a multilateral an-
tibribery agreement). 
22. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). 
23. Section 1 of the Sherman Act reads in pertinent part: 
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal. 
15 u.s.c. § 1 (1982). 
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companies cooperate in bribing.2" The use of an accomplice or sub-
sidiary to make the payment, as is common in foreign bribery,2~ 
might also suffice, depending upon the continued willingness of 
courts to recognize intraenterprise conspiracies.26 Alternatively, the 
plaintiff may allege that bribery constitutes a conspiracy between 
the briber and the recipient. Although no case squarely stands for 
this proposition, there is support for this view. Decisions outside of 
Sherman Act jurisprudence treat the agreement between briber 
and recipient as conspiratoriaP' and two decisions under the Sher-
man Act seem to reach the same conclusion, albeit without specific 
discussion.28 In addition, numerous section 1 decisions find con-
24. See, e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 399 (1921) 
(a design to accomplish a common purpose is a "combination" or "conspiracy" within the 
Sherman Act), atrg 263 F. 147, 151 (W.D. Tenn. 1920); see also United States v. Sisal Sales 
Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 274 (1927) (Sherman Act also prohibits domestic corporations from 
combining to reduce competition in foreign trade). 
25. See, e.g., Herlihy & Levine, supra note 3, at 556-57 (detailing instances of "conduit-
ing" of U.S. corporate funds through ostensibly legitimate foreign "consultants" to govern-
ment officials abroad). 
26. In Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984), the Supreme 
Court held that a company could not conspire with its wholly-owned subsidiary for the pur-
poses of section 1, id. at 771, but explicitly left open the issue of non-wholly-owned subsidi-
aries. ld. at 767. See also Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 
134, 141-42 (1968) (common ownership cannot automatically preclude separate corporate 
entities from antitrust liability under section 1); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1951) (common control of separate entities will not prevent 
application of section 1). Whether agents or accomplices can be considered conspirators for 
section 1 purposes depends upon their independence. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 
145, 149-50 (1968) (question of whether illegal combination existed turned on those parties' 
awareness of, and cooperation in, the central party's plan to restrain trade); Poller v. CBS, 
368 U.S. 464, 468-73 (1962) (weighing independent motive and intent of alleged co-
conspirators). 
27. See, e.g., Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980) (bribery of a judge held to create 
a conspiracy for the purposes of civil rights action under 42 n.s.C. § 1983 (1982)); Smithey 
v. State, 269 Ark. 538, 546-47, 602 S.W.2d 676, 680 (1980) (' [T]he crime of bribery cannot 
occur without at least two parties being involved, one offeri1• g and one receiving; therefore, 
the crime alleged would necessarily involve conspiracy ... h; see also 11 C.J.S. Bribery§ 1 
(1938) ("[T]he elements of a conspiracy are included within the substantive offense of 
agreeing to accept a bribe."); cf. People v. Wettengel, 98 Colo. 193, 195-96, 58 P.2d 279, 281 
(1935) (en bane) (briber and recipient cannot be ·convicted of conspiracy to commit bribery 
since bribery necessarily requires conspiracy). But cf. People v. Wolden, 255 Cal. App. 2d 
798, 804, 63 Cal. Rptr. 467, 470 (1967) ("Nor are the giver and receiver [of a bribe] guilty of 
a conspiracy because the two crimes require different motivies or purposes" under state 
statute), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 965 (1968). 
28. See Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, 624 F.2d 1342, 1353 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(foreign bribery, part of pattern of improper conduct, constituted a violation of section 1), 
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1982-1 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) 11 64,527, at 72,924 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (in denial of motion for dismissal , the court 
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spiracies between private firms and government officials even with-
out bribery.29 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court has 
shown a willingness to find a section 1 conspiracy on the slimmest 
basis given sufficiently anticompetitive conduct. 30 
Assuming the existence of a conspiracy, the next issue is whether 
there is restraint of trade. If the briber obtains monopoly power as 
a result of the bribe, the requirement is certainly satisfied.31 Com-
found the allegation that bribery of officials created a conspiracy to supplant competition 
sufficient to establish an actionable section 1 claim); see also Federal Prescription Serv. v. 
American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (showing of bribery in-
ducing government officials to restrict competition would constitute a conspiracy for the 
purposes of taking the defendants out of the Noerr-Pennington exception-for legitimate 
government contact by organized trade groups- to the antitrust laws), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
928 (1982). 
29. See, e.g., Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1981) (town and steamship au-
thority conspired to eliminate parking lot operator as competitor); Whitworth v. Perkins, 
559 F.2d 378, 380-81 (5th Cir. 1977) (town officials may have engaged in anticompetitive 
combination by passing zoning statute barring alcohol sales in residential areas), vacated 
sub nom. City of Impact v. Whitworth, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated per curiam sub nom. Whit-
worth v. Perkins, 576 F.2d 696 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 911 (1979); Kurek v. 
Pleasure Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 587-91 (7th Cir. 1977) (municipality's an-
ticompetitive imposition of higher costs on golf professionals at municipal golf courses), va-
cated, 435 U.S. 992, reinstated per curiam, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 1090 (1979); Duke & Co. v. Foerster, 521 F.2d 1277, 1281 (3d Cir. 1975) (local agencies 
operating public facilities conspired with concessionaire to exclude plaintiff's product from 
sale at facility); Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 501 F. Supp. 970, 
973 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (state official acting outside of legislative mandate is potentially liable 
under antitrust laws); Mason City Center Assocs. v. Mason City, 468 F. Supp. 737, 742-43 
(N.D. Iowa 1979) (anticompetitive actions of city planning officials). 
30. In Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), a newspaper distributor began to 
charge consumers a price over the publisher's recommended price, whereupon the publisher 
shifted temporarily to a new distributor to pressure the original distributor. Id. at 147-48. 
Since the new distributor cooperated in this attempt to force the original distributor's prices 
down, the Court found an unlawful combination between the publisher and the new distrib-
utor. Id. at 149-50. The Court also indicated that allegations naming the original distribu-
tor's customers as part of this conspiracy were not without some merit. Id. at 150 n.6. In 
Poller v. CBS, 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962), the Court held that allegations of a conspiracy 
between CBS and two individuals buying a television station competing with the plaintiff 
raised issues of fact precluding summary judgment. 
31. See Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 693-95 
(1962) (monopolization of trade in vanadium, including ·in the Canadian market); United 
States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 272-74 (1927) (successful effort to corner the U.S. 
market in an imported fiber). In this event, the bribe would also violate section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, which proscribes monopolization and attempts to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. § 2 
(1982). Unlike section 1, this latter section reaches single firms as well as joint conduct, but 
requires greater market impact. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 
224 n.59 (1940) (pointing out that a monopoly proscribed by section 2 is a species of the 
more general restraints of trade prohibited by section 1). Since it is more difficult to prove a 
restraint of trade meeting the stringent test of section 2, compared to that in section 1, 
section 2 is of relatively less importance in this context. 
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panies often bribe, however, to obtain individual sales or other 
contracts. Whether this constitutes an adequate restraint of trade 
is somewhat problematic. A line of mostly older cases rejected the 
notion. 32 But the reasoning generally underlying these cases-that 
commercial bribery is not one of the traditionally recognized Sher-
man Act violations-leaves much to be desired. The suggestion of 
rigid categories of viable Sherman Act claims ignores the adaptable 
nature of the Act. 33 The fundamental concern of section 1 is with 
contracts, combinations, and conspiracies which raise prices or in-
hibit free competition.34 A conspiracy between a briber and 
32. See Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, 532 F.2d 674, 687-88 (9th Cir.) (per 
curiam), cert denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 
797-805 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961); Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi 
Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 645 (D. Alaska 1982); Sterling Nelson & Sons v. Rangen, Inc., 
235 F. Supp. 393, 399-400' (D. Idaho 1964), aff'd on other grounds, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, 110 F. Supp. 96, 101 
(S.D. Cal. 1953), appeal dismissed sub nom. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Metropolitan Engrav-
ers, Ltd., 245 F.2d 67 (9th Cir. 1956). These cases, however, provide only limited authority. 
Parmelee Transportation Co. u. Keeshin did not involve the common type of commercial 
bribery, in which the briber pays the purchaser's agent to award a contract to it. Rather, the 
defendant bribed a government official who, in turn, offered favorable treatment to railroad 
companies in exchange for their award of an exclusive station transfer service contract to 
the defendant instead of the plaintiff. Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d at 796. 
Thus, the bribe did not undermine consumers' {here, the railroad companies') ability to 
obtain the advantages of free competition. It simply enabled the defendant to offer more, 
albeit illicit, consideration to those companies. Moreover, one recent opinion questioned the 
Parmelee Transportation court's reasoning. See Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 
1981) {noting that the cases upon which Parmelee Transportation rested seemed inapposite 
to the facts before the Parmelee Transportation court). Sterling Nelson & Sons u. Rangen, 
Inc. involved a classic case of commercial bribery, but the plaintiff prevailed on the Robin-
son-Patman Act claim and chose not to appeal the district court's ruling on the Sherman 
Act. See Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1965) (only 
defendants appealed the earlier ruling), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 {1966). In Calnetics Corp. 
v. Volkswagen of America, a typical case of commercial bribery, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that commercial bribery standing alone did not violate 
the Sherman Act. The court, however, left open the question of under which circumstances 
commercial bribery coupled with other conduct would constitute a violation of sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act. Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, 532 F.~ i at 687 & 
n.20. Municipality of Anchorage u. Hitachi Cable, Ltd. was bound by Calnetics. \funicipal-
ity of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. at 645. Finally, the opinio. in Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. is unclear as to whether it found that the bribe created inadequate restraint 
to constitute a section 1 violation or created an insufficient effect on interstate commerce to 
provide jurisdiction. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Blade, 110 F. Supp. at 99-101. 
33. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978); 
George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 508 F.2d 547 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. 
denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). 
34. See, e.g., Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911) (laying the groundwork 
for the Rule of Reason, used to gauge which agreements are permissible under the Sherman 
Act). 
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purchasing agent may raise prices and inhibit free competition just 
as effectively as a price-fixing combination among competitors. 
Two more recent cases hold that bribery can violate the Sher-
man Act at least as long as the individual contracts obtained pro-
duce a significant market impact. In Associated Radio Service Co. 
v. Page Airways, 85 the plaintiff and defendant competed in the 
business of outfitting private aircraft with avionics. The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendant had violated sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act by engaging in a series of unfair business practices, 
including paying bribes to obtain both domestic and foreign con-
tracts. In upholding a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the 
aggregate effect of the defendant's practices created a sufficient 
impact in the relevant market to violate both sections 1 and 2. Fo-
cusing specifically on the bribery, the court noted that the loss of 
even one contract due to a bribe produced a signficant impact in 
this case since a company could stay in business with as few as two 
contracts per year.88 Associated Radio cannot be dismissed on the 
grounds that the effect of bribery was unusually large due to an 
atypical industry. On the contrary, the market in Associated Ra-
dio, with a small number of companies competing for a few critical 
contracts, 87 typifies the situation where overseas bribery is most 
likely to occur. sa 
35. Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981). 
36. ld. at 1355. 
37. ld. at 1346. 
38. T. Gladwin & I. Walter, Multinationals Under Fire: Lessons in the Management of 
Conflict 313-14 (1980). 
The court in Associated Radio approved a jury instruction which provides a definition of 
bribery for purposes of the Sherman Act: 
Instruction Number 54: The plaintiffs contend that defendants furthered their 
anticompetitive scheme through the practice of "commercial bribery." There is a 
distinction to be made between commercial bribery of domestic corporations and 
citizens on the one hand and foreign officials on the other. I want to instruct you 
first with respect to the law on domestic commercial bribery. 
"Commercial bribery" generally is a practice whereby one company obtains 
business by making secret payments to an employee of another company who in 
return steers business to the briber. Specifically, a commercial bribe is a secret 
payment made to an employee of one corporation for that employee's personal 
benefit by an employee of another corporation for the purpose of having the 
bribed employee use his influence to cause his corporation to favor the other 
corporation in preference to the other competitors. 
1987] ANTITRUST 221 
While Associated Radio involved allegations of a variety of un-
fair practices, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia faced only allegations of bribery in City of At-
lanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc.39 One of the defendants, Western 
Contracting ("Western"), asserted a counterclaim against the city 
and a cross-claim against another firm, F.O. Thacker Contracting 
("Thacker"), which Western alleged had paid off city officials. Be-
cause of the payoff, these officials insisted that Western award a 
subcontract to Thacker for concrete work on a number of paving 
projects involved in the construction of a new terminal at the city's 
airport. When Western refused, preferring to do the concrete work 
itself, the officials awarded the paving contracts to a higher bidder. 
who granted subcontracts to Thacker. In rejecting Thacker's mo-
tion to dismiss, the district court held that the allegations of a con-
spiracy which precluded competition for the concrete work could 
state a section 1 claim. 40 The court noted that the restraint of 
trade caused by the bribe was similar to that involved in reciprocal 
dealing or tying arrangements."1 Such arrangements are per se vio-
lations of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 42 
An interesting question, for which these two decisions perhaps 
suggest conflicting answers, is whether bribery to obtain a sale or 
other contract constitutes a per se violation of section 1, thereby 
obviating any need to consider market impact. This question is be-
yond the scope of this Article. For purposes of this discussion, it is 
sufficient to note that many instances of foreign bribery will create 
enough market impact to constitute an illegal restraint of trade 
even under the less stringent Rule of Reason analysis. 
Instruction 57: Next, we come to the issue of foreign bribery .. . . 
A bribe .. . is a secret payment made to foreign government official for that 
official's personal use and for the purpose of having that official use his official 
influence to cause his government to choose the briber's product over that of a 
competitor. 
Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, 624 F.2d at 1359-61 n.27; The jury instruction 
went on to quote the bribery laws of the countries whose officials the defendant bribed. Id. 
at 1361 n.27. The court instructed the jury that the payment must be illegal under the local 
laws before they could consider it the basis for a Sherman Act violation. Id. at 1360 n.27. 
39. City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 64,527 (N.D. Ga. 
1981). 
40. Id. at 72,924. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. (citing Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958)). 
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B. The Federal Trade Commission Act 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act43 ("FTC Act") 
declares unlawful unfair methods of competition and unfair or de-
ceptive acts or practices:• This encompasses, but is not limited to, 
acts in violation of other antitrust laws. 45 Conduct is "unfair" if it 
offends public policy or causes substantial and unjustified injury to 
consumers or competitors.'6 Under this standard, bribery to gain 
sales or other competitive advantage is clearly unfair. Bribery does 
more than offend public policy; it is usually a crime.'7 Moreover, it 
harms consumers who are defrauded by the disloyalty of their 
agents and puts honest competitors at a disadvantage. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has repeatedly attacked 
commercial bribery under section 5. In the FTC's early years, this 
was a major focus of its enforcement efforts:8 The response of the 
courts was ambivalent. In one case, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit questioned whether commercial brib-
ery creates sufficient impact on the public interest to violate sec-
tion 5.'9 Another court, however, concluded without discussion that 
bribery falls within the statute's reach. 50 These decisions are rather 
old and precede both a liberalization in the judicial interpretation 
of section sen and a 1938 amendment to the section. 52 Congress 
passed this amendment to undercut restrictive judicial interpreta-
tions of section 5 by expanding its reach from unfair methods of 
competition to also include unfair acts or practices. 53 As a result, 
43. Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"} § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982 & Supp. III 
1985}. 
44. Section 5 of the FTC Act, as amended, states: 
Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or decep-
tive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful. 
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1} (1982}. 
45. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 240 (1972}. 
46. Id. 
47. See supra note 4. 
48. See Note, Bribery in Commercial Relationships, 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1248, 1251 (1932}. 
49. See New Jersey Asbestos Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 509, 510 (2d Cir. 1920}. The court con-
cluded that the entertainment of employees involved in the proceeding did not constitute a 
fraud on their employers; i.e., a bribe. Thus, its discussion of the applicability of section 5 to 
bribery is dictum. 
50. See T.C. Hurst & Son v. FTC, 268 F. 874 (E.D. Va. 1920} (refusing to enjoin FTC 
prosecution of commercial briber}. 
51. See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972}; FTC v. Brown Shoe 
Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966); FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S. 304 (1934}. 
52. Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938, ch. 49, § 3, 52 Stat. ll1, lll. 
53. See generally FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (finding that 
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even though no court has considered the issue for decades, a suc-
cessful challenge to the FTC's long-standing position that commer-
cial bribery violates section 56 ' seems unlikely. 
One limitation, however, may curb the usefulness of the FTC 
Act against bribery. No private cause of action exists under the 
statute. 66 Thus, competitors defeated through bribes may receive 
no compensation. Also, prosecution of bribers depends upon the 
resources and priorities of the FTC. But, even though the FTC's 
activity in the area waned in the years following its early enforce-
ment efforts, it never stopped.66 More recently, the FTC issued or-
ders against Lockheed, Boeing, and McDonnell Douglas for com-
mitting bribery overseas. 67 
C. The Robinson-Patman Act 
A third basis of liability for firms engaging in bribery is section 
2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act.68 This section proscribes the 
payment of brokerage fees, commissions, and other compensation 
to agents in connection with the sale of goods except for services 
actually rendered. 69 Its principal purpose is to prevent the pay-
ment of false commissions and fees as a means of price discrimina-
the 1938 Wheeler-Lea Amendment to section 5 charged the FTC with protecting consumers 
as well as competitors). 
54. See 16 C.F.R. § 13.315 (1986) (defining commercial bribery as an unfair trade 
practice). 
55. Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Carlson v. Coca-Cola 
Co., 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973); cf. Guernsey v. Rich P lan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 
582, 586-89 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (distinguishing Holloway u. Bristol-Meyers Corp. on its facts 
and holding that a private cause of action may exist under section 5, where the FTC has 
previously examined the complained of practices at issue in another district and found them 
so wanting as to require issuance of a cease and desist order). 
56. See, e.g., In re National Grain Yeast Corp., 33 F.T.C. 684 (1941). 
57. In re McDonnell Douglas Corp., 92 F.T.C. 976 (1978); In re Boeing Co., 92 F.T.C. 972 
(1978); In re Lockheed Corp., 92 F.T.C. 968 (1978). 
58. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982). 
59. Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, as amended, provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such 
commerce, to pay or grant, or to receive or accept, anything of value as a com-
mission, brokerage, or other compensation, or any allowance or discount in lieu 
thereof, except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase of 
goods, wares, or merchandise, either to the other party to such transaction or to 
the agent, representative, or other intermediary therein where such intermediary 
is acting in fact for or in the behalf, or is subject to the direct or indirect control, 
of any party to such transaction other than the person by whom such compensa-
tion is so granted or paid. 
15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982). 
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tion. 60 In addition, courts have repeatedly held that it prohibits a 
bribe made for the purpose of procuring a sales contract. 61 
This interpretation of section 2(c) originated in Fitch v. Kerlt-
tucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co.62 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that a coal company violated 
section 2(c) when one of its employees paid the president of the 
plaintiff power company to purchase coal from it.63 Two decades 
later, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit fol-
lowed Fitch in a suit brought by a disappointed competitor. In 
Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons,64 the defendant had ob-
tained contracts for the sale of fish feed to the State of Idaho De-
partment of Fisheries by bribing a state official.66 The Ninth Cir-
cuit held that this conduct violated section 2(c) of the Robinson-
Patman Act and allowed the plaintiff to collect treble damages 
measured by the amount the plaintiff would have earned had it 
obtained sales with the state in proportion to the share of con-
tracts awarded to it after the bribery ceased.66 
Fitch and Rangen have been criticized on various grounds. Ad-
mittedly, the prohibition of bribery is not immediately apparent 
on the face of the statute. But, these cases reflect the view that the 
60. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 168 (1960). 
61. See infra notes 62-75 and accompanying text. 
62. Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943). 
63. Id. at 16. While Fitch allowed recovery by the defrauded principal, later decisions 
disagree over whether this party, as opposed to a competitor defeated through bribery, has 
standing under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Compare Bunker Ramo 
Corp. v. Cywan, 511 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that where an agent for the 
principal corporation took bribes from the defendant supplier to insure a sales contract with 
the principal, there was no cognizable injury to the plaintiff principal under the Robinson-
Patman Act, since the Act would only apply to the suppliers' competitors who were injured 
by the bribe) and Computer Statistics, Inc. v. Blair, 418 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1976) 
(holding that some anticompetitive effect on the plaintiff is necessary to establish a cause of 
action under commercial bribery provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act, and a plaintiff 
who cannot show such injury lacks standing to complain about bribes) with Municipality of 
Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633 (D. Alaska 1982) (holding that competi-
tive injury to the plaintiff is not required to maintain an action under the Robinson-Patman 
Act). 
64. Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 
u.s. 936 (1966). 
65. ld. at 854-55. 
66. Id., aff'g 235 F. Supp. 393 (D. Idaho 1964). Rangen illustrates one creative way to deal 
with the issue of showing that but for the bribe the plaintiff would have obtained the sale. 
However, in Computer Statistics, Inc. v. Blair, 418 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1976), the court 
went one step further by foregoing proof of what the plaintiff would have obtained but for 
the bribe. Instead, the court awarded damages measured by the defendant's profits. Id. at' 
1349. 
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bribe is "compensation" to an "agent" which is not "for services 
rendered in connection with the sale." Of course, this ignores the 
services the agent performed for the briber-a result that the court 
in Rangen argued is compelled by legislative history.67 Even if the 
language of section 2(c) can reasonably be read to encompass brib-
ery, numerous commentators have argued that bribery has little to 
do with the general goals of the antitrust laws and the specific 
anti-price discrimination objective of the Robinson-Patman Act.68 
The former argument, however, ignores the anticompetitive impact 
of bribery69 and both Fitch and Rangen reject the latter conten-
tion. Nothing in the language of section 2(c) indicates that the ex-
istence of price discrimination is a precondition for application. 70 
67. Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d at 856-57. Earlier cases held that 
section 2(c) prohibits the payment by the seller for services rendered by an agent of the 
buying party, and that it is immaterial whether the services rendered to the seller were 
legitimate, since the agent cannot serve two masters. See Modern Mktg. Serv. v. FTC, 149 
F.2d 970 (7th Cir. 1945); Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1939). The Rangen court declined to rely on these cases, but simply 
concluded that the "services rendered" exception of sec::tion 2(c) may not reach disloyal con-
duct. See also Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that section 
2(c) may apply where an agent attempts to serve two masters). 
Fitch and Rangen gave cursory treatment to another argument concerning the language of 
section 2(c). The defendants asserted that the very disloyalty of accepting a bribe meant 
that the recipient could not be considered an agent, at least for purposes of the transaction 
at issue. This argument finds no support in agency law. See Restatement (Second) of 
Agency § 391 (1958). It is also inconsistent with references in the section's legislative history 
to bribed agents. See, e.g., 80 Cong. Rec. 7759-60 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Patman). 
Rangen went one step further in its interpretation of who is an "agent, representative, or 
other intermediary" for purposes of section 2(c). The bribed official was not directly respon-
sible for selecting suppliers of fish feed; nevertheless, he used his influence upon those who 
were. The court held that this was enough. This holding is of great significance in the for-
eign bribery context where payments often involve buying influence. Lockheed's payment to 
Japanese politicians for promoting the sale of its planes provides one example. See In re 
Lockheed Corp., 92 F.T.C. 968 (1978). 
68. See, e.g., 2 R. CaBman, The Law of Unfair Competition Trademarks and Monopolies 
§ 12.01 (L. Altman 4th ed. 1982); Rill & Frank, supra note 3, at 144-49; Zamansky, Preferen-
tial Treatment, Payoffs and the Antitrust Laws: Distortion of the Competitive Process 
Through Commercial Bribery, 83 Com. L.J. 558, 561-66 (1978); Recent Case, 79 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1531, 1533-34 (1966). 
69. The court in Fitch aptly noted: 
Plainly, the payment of the secret commissions to Fitch . .. resulted in lessen-
ing competition in the sale of coal to the Power Company. It would have been 
practically impossible for any other company to sell coal to appellee, when the 
president of the Power Company had such an understanding with the Coal Com-
pany and such a motive to purchase from it all the coal requirements for his 
company. 
Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12, 16 (6th Cir. 1943). 
70. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 
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Moreover, passages in the legislative history suggest that Congress, 
when enacting the provision, was indeed concerned with agents 
who receive bribes. 71 
In any event, these arguments are probably moot as a growing 
number of United States courts of appeals follow the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits in viewing section 2(c) as prohibiting bribery in the 
sale of goods. 72 While the Supreme Court has never ruled on the 
(1960), courts agreed that section 2(c) did not require any finding of price discrimination. 
See Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607, 609 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 774 
(1945); Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 
(1939). Henry Brach & Co. introduced uncertainty on this question with its references to 
discriminatory price reductions unjustified by cost savings. FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 
U.S. at 173; see also Ideal Plumbing Co. v. Benco, Inc., 529 F.2d 972, 976 n.3 (8th Cir. 1976) 
(noting that the Supreme Court's decision in Henry Brach & Co. unsettled the interpreta-
tion of section 2(c) by emphasizing that discrimination is in fact an element of the statutory 
proscription). The court in Rangen, however, noted that Henry Brach & Co. only looked to 
the existence of discrimination to determine if the seller's broker reduced its commission in 
lieu of granting brokerage to the buyer. Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d at 
858. Thus, discrimination remains irrelevant to outright payments. 
71. A practice has grown up whereby large mass buyers bribe representatives of the 
seller . . . under the guise of a brokerage allowance. It is not a brokerage allow-
ance at all; it is a bribe. [Section 2(c)) will not compel the use of a broker but it 
will prohibit one party from 'bribing the representative of the other under the 
guise of brokerage allowances or commissions. 
80 Cong. Rec. 7759-60 (remarks of Rep. Patman). See H.R. Rep. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 14 (1936). But see Recent Case, supra note 68, at 1533-34 (arguing that legislative 
history passages quoted by Rangen are taken out of context and do not show concern for 
commercial bribery). 
72. See, e.g., Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft, 716 F.2d 245 
(4th Cir. 1983); Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170, 173 (7th Cir. 1976) (also finding that 
the bribe had a discriminatory effect); Ideal Plumbing Co. v. Benco, Inc., 529 F.2d 972, 977-
78 (8th Cir. 1976) (dicta); Jones v. Borden Co., 430 F.2d 568, 571-72 (5th Cir. 1970) (dicta). 
But see Excel Handbag Co. v. Edison Bros. Stores, 630 F.2d 379, 386-87 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(refused to reach question of whether commercial bribery violates section 2(c)). The Ninth 
Circuit continues to adhere to its decision in Rangen. See May Dep't Store v. Graphic Pro-
cess Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 1980); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, 
532 F.2d 674, 696 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976). In addition, a 
number of United States district courts applied section 2(c) against commercial bribery. See 
Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Cable, Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 637-41, 644 (D. Alaska 
1982); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Cywan, 511 F. Supp. 531, 533 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Computer Sta-
tistics, Inc. v. Blair, 418 F. Supp. 1339, 1347 (S.D. Tex. 1976); Stutzman Feed Serv. v. Todd 
& Sargent, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 417, 419 (S.D. Iowa 1972); Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. 
Loveman & Sons, 227 F. Supp. 829, 833 (N.D. Ohio 1964); Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. 
Amstar Corp., 447 F. Supp. 867, 882-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (dicta), rev'd on other grounds, 602 
F.2d 1025 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 917 (1979); cf. Rodman v. Haines, 1976-2 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) ~ 61,074, at 69,841-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (section 2(c) inapplicable to commercial 
bribery not in context of sale of goods) (distinguishing Fitch, Rangen, and Canadian Inger-
soll-Rand). But cf. Kasper Wire Works v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 85, 90 
(M.D. Fla. 1976) ("The Robinson-Patman Act is aimed at price discrimination, not conspir-
acy .... ") (citation omitted), aff'd on other grounds, 575 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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issue, it has twice indicated its concurrence in dicta. 73 Further-
more, given the arguably detrimental impact of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act in general, and section 2(c) in particular,74 using the sec-
tion to combat bribery may be its most benefici~l application. Such 
application of section 2(c) to bribes, however, suffers from one lim-
itation. It only reaches payments made in connection with a sale of 
goods. Bribes made to obtain service contracts or leases are not 
covered.75 
Ill. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION AGAINST 
FOREIGN COMPANIES 
A. Theoretical Foundation 
Given that bribery often violates the antitrust laws, can these 
laws apply when the bribe occurs overseas and the briber is an 
agent or employee of a foreign company? First, it is necessary to 
obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.76 The 
problems associated with obtaining personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident defendant have been explored elsewhere77 and hence 
will not be developed here. It should suffice to note that a suit 
involving bribery raises no problems of personal jurisdiction differ-
ent from any other litigation with foreign entities involving con-
duct occurring overseas. As a practical matter, the minimum con-
tacts requirement78 probably limits the class of prospective 
73. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972); 
FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166, 174 (1960). 
74. See, e.g., Report of the White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy ("Neal Report"), 
ch. 4, at 1-10 (1968), reprinted in 1 J . Reprints for Antitrust L. & Econ. 631, 687-96 (1969). 
75. May Dep't Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 1980); Freeman 
v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 505 F.2d 527, 529 (7th Cir. 1974); Rodman v. Haines, 1976-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 61,074, at 69,841-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Stutzman Feed Serv. v. Todd & 
Sargeant, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 417, 419 (S.D. Iowa 1972). 
76. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); International Shoe 
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (requiring "minimum contacts" for jurisdiction); see 
also United States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948) (case involving a 
foreign firm conducting its business in the United States through subsidiaries). 
77. See, e.g., Friedman & Wilson, Representing Foreign Clients in Civil Discovery and 
Grand Jury Proceedings, 26 Va. J. Int'l L. 327, 335-41 (1986). 
78. Friedman and Wilson indicate that 
[e]ven fairly minimal contacts with the forum country suffice to establish "spe-
cific jurisdiction" where the contact itself gives rise to the cause of action. Spe-
cific jurisdiction has its limits, however, and when the relationship between the 
foreign party's contacts with the forum state and the facts surrounding the cause 
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defendants to the larger foreign multinational firms which do busi-
ness in the United States as well as abroad.79 
Personal jurisdiction, however, is not a sufficient basis upon 
which to apply U.S. law. Legislative (or proscriptive) jurisdiction 
must also exist.80 In its simplest terms, this means that Congress 
intended the legislation to apply to the overseas transaction and 
that the United States Constitution imposes no barrier to carrying 
out this intent. 81 When the intent of Congress is unstated, as it 
often is, courts must turn to general principles of proscriptive ju-
risdiction which are· widely accepted in United States jurispru-
dence82 and customary international law. 83 
Five principles govern a nation's power to apply its own law to 
any conduct: universality, the protective principle, nationality, pas-
sive personality, and territoriality.8• Three of these clearly do not 
apply to overseas bribery by foreign competitors. Although bribery 
of action become sufficiently attenuated, a court lacks jurisdiction. "General ju-
risdiction," which is based on the overall presence of a party within the forum 
and not on contacts related specifically to the cause of action, demands a far 
higher level of minimum contacts. To assert general jurisdiction, it must be 
shown that the foreign party has business contacts with the forum that are "con-
tinuous and systematic." Unless it is possible to show contacts between a foreign 
party and the forum necessary to maintain specific or general jurisdiction, due 
process prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction by a domestic court. 
Id. at 335-36 (footnotes omitted). 
79. An interesting question is whether the effect on the U.S. company losing business due 
to bribery would be sufficient in itself to create personal jurisdiction over the foreign briber. 
Some authority suggests that causing a foreseeable effect within the United States may pro-
vide an adequate basis for personal jurisdiction. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of 
Laws § 37 (1971); Quattrone v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. App. 3d 296, 303-06, 118 Cal. Rptr. 
548, 552-54 (1975); see also Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 
(2d Cir. 1972) (discussing various bases for the exercise of personal jurisdiction). More re-
cent decisions by the Supreme Court, however, indicate that due process requires more. See 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 
436 u.s. 84 (1978). 
80. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 401 (Tent. 
Draft No. 6, 1985) [hereinafter Restatement, Tent. Draft No. 6]. 
81. See, e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339 (2d 
Cir. 1972); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945). 
82. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States§§ 17-18 (1965); 
Restatement, Tent. Draft No. 6, supra note 80, §§ 402-404. 
83. See I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 299-305 (3d ed. 1979); see also 
Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18 (1804) ("[A]n act of 
congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations .... "). 
84. See, e.g., Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 
U.S. 884 (1967); Harvard Research on International Law: Jurisdiction With Respect to 
Crime, 29 Am. J. lnt'l L. Supp. 435, 445 (1935); Restatement, Tent. Draft No.6, supra note 
80, §§ 402-404; Blakesley, supra note 17, at 686-719. 
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is universally condemned, it is not a crime, such as piracy or geno-
cide, which is so heinous as to allow for universal jurisdiction. 85 
Nor do overseas bribes made by foreign firms come within the pro-
tective principle because they do not threaten the security of the 
United States government.86 The nationality principle obviously 
does not apply when the bribe is made by a foreign company.87 
Passive personality (jurisdiction based upon the nationality of the 
victim), however, would seem to apply when the bribe harms a de-
feated U.S. competitor.88 But, the United States does not recognize 
the passive personality principle.89 The only remaining basis for 
the exercise of jurisdiction is the territorial principle.90 This princi-
ple encompasses conduct both within the United States (subjective 
territoriality)91 and without the United States when the conduct 
causes undesirable effects within the country (so-called objective 
territoriality).92 This latter form of the territorial principle may 
well apply to foreign bribery. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice held that objec-
tive territoriality, or the effects test, is consistent with interna-
tional law in the Case of the S.S. Lotus.93 Many nations,9" includ-
85. See Restatement, Tent. Draft No. 6, supra note 80, § 404. 
86. Id. § 402(3) & comment f. 
87. See id. § 402(2). 
88. The passive personality theory allows a state, in certain circumstances, to apply its 
law to an act committed outside its territory by a person who is not its national, on the basis 
that the victim of the act was its national. See generally id. § 402 comment g (defining the 
"passive personality principle"). 
89. J. Brierly, Law of Nations 302 (1955); Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law 
of the United States § 30(2) comment e; Blakesley, supra note 17, at 715; see also U.S. Dep't 
of State, Report on Extraterritorial Crime and Cutting's Case, U.S. Foreign Relations 751, 
757 (1887), reported in 2 J.B. Moore, International Law Digest 232-40 (1906). Cutting's Case 
involved the Mexican government's imprisonment of a U.S. citizen for publishing an article 
in a U.S. newspaper which supposedly slandered a Mexican national. The United States 
rejected the Mexican government's jurisdictional claim which was based upon the passive 
personality principle. See id. 
90. Restatement, Tent. Draft No. 6, supra note 80, § 402 comment c. 
91. ld. § 402(1)(a)-(b). 
92. Id. § 402(1)(c). 
93. Case of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7); see gener-
ally Hudson, The Sixth Year of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 22 Am. J. 
Int'l L. 1, 8 (1928) (discussion of S .S. Lotus). This adjudication arose when France protested 
the prosecution by Turkey of a French national who negligently allowed his vessel to collide 
with a Turkish ship, killing several of its crew. Even though the negligent conduct occurred 
aboard a French vessel in international waters, it created effects aboard the Turkish ship, 
which the court considered to be Turkish territory. 
94. See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 18 re-
porter's note 4 (1965) (citing The King v. Oliphant, [1905] 2 K.B. 67; Judgment of July 2, 
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ing the United States,911 regularly employ this principle. Some 
countries have criticized the United States for using this principle 
to extend the reach of regulatory statutes, particularly the anti-
trust laws,96 to overseas conduct based upon economic rather than 
physical effects.97 The United States is not alone, however, in as-
serting proscriptive jurisdiction based upon economic effects. 98 
Moreover, a review of protests against extraterritorial antitrust ju-
risdiction99 found that they really reflected political and philosoph-
ical differences with the substantive regulation as applied in cer-
tain cases rather than an objection to the underlying jurisdictional 
principle. 100 
1932 (Milleli, gerant de la Tribuna, et Davanzati v. Turati), Cour de Cassation (ch. crim.), 
Fr., [1932] 2 Gazette du Palais 532; Judgment of Feb. 27, 1906 (In re Bistagne), Cour de 
Cassation penale de Vaud, Switz., 1906 Journal des Tribunaux, Cantonal 267); infra note 98. 
95. See, e.g., Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 
F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. 
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). 
96. See Restatement, Tent. Draft No. 6, supra note 80, § 415 Uurisdiction to apply anti-
trust laws); see also Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 
416 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986) (securities laws). 
97. See, e.g., Letter from the British Embassy in Washington to the United States Gov-
ernment (Nov. 27, 1979), reprinted in A.V. Lowe, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 183 (1983); 
see generally Restatement, Tent. Draft No. 6, supra note 80, § 402 reporter's note 2 ("effects 
doctrine" and economic regulation). 
98. See, e.g., Kartellgesetz § 4, 1972 Bundesgesetzblatt No. 460 (Aus.) (Cartel Act); Com-
bines Investigation Act, R.S.C. ch. C-23, § 32(5) (1970); Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbs-
beschrankungen § 98(2), 1957 Bundesgesetzblatt I 1081, 1099 (as amended) (W. Ger.) (Act 
Against Restraints on Competition); Imperial Chern. Indus. v. Commission des Com-
munautes europeennes (Dyestuffs Case), 18 Recueil 619, 665-66, [1971-1973 Transfer 
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 11 8161, at 8030-31 (1972); Beguelin Import Co. v. G.L. 
Import Export S.A., 17 Recueil 949, 959-60, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. 
Rep. (CCH) 11 8149, at 7704 (1972); see generally Restatement, Tent. Draft No. 6, supra note 
80, § 415 reporter's note 9 (convergence of U.S. and foreign antitrust laws); OECD Report of 
the Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices, Restrictive Business Practices 
of Multinational Enterprises 11 120, at 37 (1977) ("[T]he criterion of effects is embodied in 
the legislation of Germany, Austria, Denmark, Spain, France, Sweden, and Finland; it has 
moreover been recognized in the case law of Canada, Japan, Switzerland, the United States 
and the European Communities and attested by doctrine in Belgium."). 
99. See Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary International Law, 78 Am. J. 
Int'l L. 783 (1984). · 
100. For example, the leading U.S. antitrust case applying the effects test, United States 
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), was rather favorably received 
abroad at the time of its decision, whereas many of the cases eliciting protests, such as 
Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); In re Ura-
nium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980); and United States v. Watchmakers of 
Switzerland Information Center, 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order 
modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), involved conduct occurring at 
least in part in the United States. 
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Interestingly, one of the leading cases recogmzmg the effects 
principle in the United States involved the crime of bribery. In 
Strassheim v. Daily/ 0 1 the defendant bribed a Michigan prison 
warden to accept inferior goods in fulfillment of a contract with 
the state. Although the defendant made the offer to the warden in 
Chicago, the United States Supreme Court held that Michigan 
could prosecute under its criminal law since the effect occurred in 
Michigan.102 Bribery's effect, however, is not limited to the loss 
suffered by the defrauded principal-in Strassheim, the Michigan 
prison system. It also extends to the loss suffered by any competi-
tors defeated through the use of a bribe. Therefore, if the effect on 
a defrauded principal within a state is enough to give the state 
jurisdiction to proscribe, the effect on a defeated competitor within 
a state should be sufficient as well. 
B. The Sherman Act 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits restraints of trade or 
commerce among the states or "with foreign nations."103 The semi-
nal decision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("Al-
coa")104 established the broad jurisdictional reach of this prohibi-
tion. The government, in addition to its primary action against the 
Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa") for monopolizing the domestic 
aluminum industry, brought an action against a Canadian com-
pany, Aluminum Ltd., which had entered into an agreement set-
ting production quotas with other foreign producers of alumi-
101. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911). 
102. Id. at 284-85. Some of the defendant's conduct occurred in Michigan, but the Court 
does not appear to treat this fact as critical. Later cases interpret Strassheim as not limited 
in its holding by this fact. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 549 F.2d 954, 956 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 949 (1977); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.), 
rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 
(1969); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945). But see 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1182 n.45 (E.D. Pa. 
1980) (distinguishing Strassheim as an interstate rather than an international effect case 
and as involving some activity of the defendant in the prosecuting state). 
103. 15 u.s.c. § 1 (1982). 
104. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (L. Hand, 
J.). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit heard this appeal acting as a 
special statutory court since a quorum of the United States Supreme Court could not be 
obtained. ld. at 421. As a result, the precedential weight of this decision is greater than 
simply that of a United States court of appeals opinion. American Tobacco Co. v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946). 
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num. 105 The court held that the Sherman Act applied to this 
agreement, even though foreign companies made and performed 
the agreement abroad, as long as it was intended to and did affect 
U.S. imports or exports.106 While the production quotas in Alcoa 
presumably affected imports, numerous courts have since held that 
restraints impeding opportunities for U.S. exporters also fall 
within the reach of the Sherman Act.107 Thus, loss of exports for 
U.S. firms due to bribery appears to provide a basis for enforce-
ment· of the Sherman Act. 108 
105. The government challenged whether Aluminum Ltd. was independent of Alcoa. The 
district court found the two companies to be independent, however, and the court of appeals 
accepted this finding. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 440-41. 
106. Id. at 444. The fact that the production quotas took into account Aluminum Ltd.'s 
sales into the United States established the intent to affect U.S. imports. While the record 
contained no evidence of actual effect, the court presumed such based upon the showing of 
intent. Id. at 444-45. 
107. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc. , 395 U.S. 100, 132 (1969) 
(patent pool impeded exports of U.S. televisions to Canada); Continental Ore Co. v. Union 
Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962) (preclusion of U.S. exporter from selling 
vanadium to Canada); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1291-92 
(3d Cir. 1979) (fraudulently secured foreign patents prevented U.S. company's exports of 
vinyl floor covering); Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 
F.2d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 1975) (restricted supply of oranges available to U.S. exporter of 
oranges to Hong Kong), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); United States v. C. Itoh & Co., 
1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 65,()10, at 70,607 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (consent decree against 
buyer's cartel activities by Japanese importers of processed seafood from Alaska); Daishowa 
Int'I v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 64,774, at 71,788-90 (N.D. Cal. 
1982) (buyers' cartel activities by Japanese importers of wood chips from the United 
States); Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 1978-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'II 62,378, at 
76,258 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (block booking by U.S. motion picture film supplier foreclosed other 
U.S. film exporters from South African market); Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. 
Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 61,256, at 70,783 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) 
(reciprocal dealing agreement foreclosed opportunity for competing U.S. refinery engineer-
ing firms to export services to Italian company); Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 
635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (exclusive franchise agreements precluded access to foreign mar-
kets by competing U.S. soft drink company); United States v. Learner Co., 215 F. Supp. 603, 
605-07 (D. Hawaii 1963) (competing U.S. dealers in scrap metal foreclosed from exporting to 
Japan); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 961 (D. Mass. 
1950) (effect of overseas joint venture activities was to preclude exports by competing U.S. 
manufacturers of coated abrasives), decree amended, 96 F. Supp. 356 (D. Mass. 1951). 
108. Bribery might also be used to gain exclusive access to natural resources or to impede 
a competitor's ability to conduct other business operations. See Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. 
Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 405 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 1040 (1984). Obtaining exclusive access to resources will often affect U.S. imports. In 
this event, the Sherman Act can apply. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 274-
75 (1927) (access to Mexican sisal); Industrial lnv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 
883 (5th Cir. 1982) (access to Indonesian lumber), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007, reaff'd per curiam 
on remand, 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Timberlane Lumber 
Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 1976) (access to Honduran lumber); 
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Before concluding that the Sherman Act will apply, however, 
three questions must be answered. The first is whether the Sher-
man Act can apply to conduct undertaken exclusively by foreign 
parties and occurring exclusively abroad. Most of the decisions ap-
plying the Sherman Act against companies impeding U.S. exports 
involved U.S. defendants.109 In addition, many of these decisions 
involved at least some activity by the defendants in the United 
States. 110 Nevertheless, Alcoa held that the Sherman Act does 
reach conduct committed exclusively abroad and solely by foreign 
companies and the opinion did not distinguish between an effect 
on imports or exports in reaching this conclusion.111 Similarly, in 
Daishowa International v. North Coast Export Co.,112 a decision 
involving buyers' cartel activities by Japanese importers, the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of Califor-
nia applied the Sherman Act even though the principal defendant 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal. 
1971) (access to offshore oil from a Persian Gulf nation), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 
461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). Impeding other business oppor-
tunites for U.S. firms might also affect imports or exports. If not, the Sherman Act will not 
apply. 
109. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 104 (1969); 
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 690 (1962); Manning-
ton Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1292 (3d Cir. 1979); Pacific Coast Agri-
cultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enterprises, Inc., 1978-2 Trade Cas. 
(CCH) 11 62,378, at 76,255 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Ex-
xon Research & Eng'g Co., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 61,256, at 70,776 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); 
Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); United States v. Learner 
Co., 215 F. Supp. 603, 605 (D. Hawaii 1963); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 
92 F. Supp. 947, 951 (D. Mass. 1950), decree amended, 96 F. Supp. 356 (D. Mass. 1951). 
110. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706 
(1962) ("As in Sisal, the conspiracy was laid in the United States, was effectuated both here 
and abroad .... "); Pacific Coast Agricultural Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 
F.2d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976); Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 
411 F. Supp. 635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) ("The challenged conduct includes actions taken with 
[sic] the United States."); United States v. Learner Co., 215 F. Supp. 603, 605 (D. Hawaii 
1963); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 951 (D. Mass. 1950), 
decree amended, 96 F. Supp. 356 (D. Mass. 1951). 
111. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); see also 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1186-87 (E.D. Pa. 
1980) (rejecting the argument that the Sherman Act could not reach a foreign company 
which acted solely outside the United States); cf. Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers 
Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Sherman Act applied against British distill-
ers who included termination provisions in distributorship agreements with U.S. distribu-
tors of Scotch whiskey sold F.O.B. England). 
112. Daishowa Int'l v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 64,774 (N.D. 
Cal. 1982). 
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was a Japanese company. The court was also apparently uncon-
cerned with the location of the illegal conduct.113 
The second question is whether bribery can cause a sufficient 
effect, both in nature and magnitude, on exports to meet the stan-
dards enunciated by the courts and recently written into the Sher-
man Act by Congress.114 Alcoa required both an effect on imports 
or exports and an intent to cause the effect.116 Subsequent cases 
show variations in the magnitude of effect required, 116 the degree 
of intent which must exist,117 and whether the test is conjunctive 
or disjunctive. 118 In 1982, as part of the Export Trading Company 
Act, 119 Congress amended the Sherman Act to clarify the stan-
dard. 120 The amendment requires that any effect be on stateside 
U.S. exporters rather than on offshore companies even if U.S.-
owned.121 The amendment further specifies that the effect must be 
113. This case began as a breach of contract action by a Japanese paper company against 
a U.S. export trade association who agreed to supply wood chips. The trade association 
counterclaimed, alleging that the Japanese purchasers of wood chips conspired to divide 
suppliers they would buy from, fix prices they would pay, and boycott any objecting sellers. 
The district court rejected the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. 
at 77,786. The parties disputed the location of the Japanese company's conduct, but the 
court seemingly ignored this factor in deciding to apply U.S. law. While Daishowa Interna-
tional involved foreign buyers rather than competitors, this should not make any difference. 
For a similar case, see United States v. C. ltoh & Co., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 65,010 
(W.D. Wash. 1982). 
114. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, § 
402, 96 Stat. 1246, 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1)(B) (1982)). 
115. See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
116. See Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 687 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (any effect which is not de minimis); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes 
Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 103 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (any effect that is not both insubstan-
tial and indirect), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 450 (1972); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 1963 
Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 70,600, at 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (substantial and material effect re-
quired), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
117. Compare Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 227 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (intent requirement may be satisfied by the rule that a person is presumed 
to intend the natural consequences of his actions) with United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (finding an intent to affect imports based upon 
including sales to the United States in production quotas). 
118. Compare United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 
1945) (intent to affect imports as well as the effect are required) with Mannington Mills, 
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979) (intent not required, but only 
one factor in whether to assert jurisdiction). 
119. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233. 
120. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 
Stat. 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982)). 
121. 15 U.S.C. § 6a(l)(B) (1982). 
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direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable.122 
The foreseeability requirement is easily met when bribery is 
used to gain sales or some other competitive advantage. The effect 
of usurping a competitor's export opportunities in such a case is 
more than reasonably foreseeable; it is the very purpose of the 
bribe. Moreover, in most cases the briber knows who his competi-
tors are. Even if he does not, the briber should expect that one of 
his competitors will be a U.S. firm, given their frequent presence in 
international trade. The requirement that the effect be direct 
poses no more difficulty. When one firm gains sales over another 
through bribery, the effect of lost exports is about as direct as can 
be.123 This is very different from the sort of incidental impact al-
leged in cases where courts refused to apply the Sherman Act. 12" 
The requirement that the effect be substantial causes greater 
concern. Bribery often leads to the loss of specific sales rather than 
preclusion from an entire market. Even if this creates a restraint of 
trade sufficient to violate section 1 in the domestic context, it may 
not cause a sufficiently large reduction in exports to allow overseas 
jurisdiction. No clear standard exists as to when the magnitude of 
effect reaches a substantial level.126 Perhaps loss of one small con-
tract due to a payoff would not suffice. In any event, few plaintiffs 
would find it worthwhile to sue a foreign briber over a small con-
tract. Loss of a major contract, however, easily qualifies as a sub-
stantial effect under the ordinary meaning of the term. 126 Such a 
loss creates far more impact than that present in any of the deci-
sions where courts found an inadequate effect to sustain Sherman 
Act jurisdiction over conduct abroad.127 It also qualifies under 
122. Id. § 6a(1). 
123. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 103 n.15 
(C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 461 F.2d 92 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 
u.s. 950 (1972). 
124. National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1981) (Ca-
nadian bank excluded from bankcard system argued its cardholders would have used them 
to make purchases in the United States); EI Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 551 F. Supp. 
626, 628 (S.D.N. Y. 1982) (foreign plaintiff alleged it would have purchased mining equip-
ment in the United States if defendants' conduct had not prevented it from gaining Bolivian 
mining concession). 
125. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 611 (9th Cir. 1976). 
126. Cf. Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research & Eng'g Co., 1977-1 
Trade Cas. (CCH) 1J 61,256 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (one contract for refinery engineering). 
127. See, e.g., National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 
1981) (refusal to continue Canadian bank in bankcard system not shown to have any an-
ticompetitive or deleterious effect on U.S. commerce); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 
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court decisions determining whether the Sherman Act applies to 
intrastate activities. For jurisdiction under the Sherman Act to ex-
ist, intrastate activities must substantially affect interstate com-
merce. 128 In this context, courts find that a small dollar impact is 
adequate.129 Since the substantial effect requirement originated in 
661 F.2d 864, 870-71 (lOth Cir. 1981) (refusal to sell Canadian company potash mixed in 
Canada for resale to North Korea had inadequate effect on U.S. commerce), cert. denied, 
455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102, 1106-07 
(S.D.N. Y. 1984) (price fixing in Europe had no effect on U.S. commerce); Power East Ltd. v. 
Transamerica Delaval Inc., 558 F. Supp. 47, 48 (S.D.N.Y.) (forcing Cypriot company out of 
business in Saudi Arabia affected neither U.S. competitors nor markets), aff'd mem., 742 
F.2d 1439 (2d Cir. 1983); El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 551 F. Supp. 626, 629-31 
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (preventing foreign company from getting capital for Bolivian gold mining 
had inadequate effect on U.S. commerce when the company had never before shipped gold 
to the United States and had only a "vague and undocumented hope" that without the 
defendant's conduct it would have shipped gold to the United States); A.G.S. Electronics, 
Ltd. v. B.S.R. (U.S.A.), Ltd., 460 F. Supp. 707, 711-12 (S.D.N.Y.) (termination of Canadian 
company as a distributor of record players to Canada and Far East did not have any an-
ticompetitive effect on U.S. consumers or exporters), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1329 (2d Cir. 
1978). 
128. McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 241-43 (1980); Hospi-
tal Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 (1976). 
129. See Cardio-Medical Assocs., Ltd. v. Crozer-Chester Medical Center, 721 F.2d 68, 76 
(3d Cir. 1983) (blocking expansion efforts of four cardiologists created a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce when twelve percent of their patients, accounting for hundreds of 
thousands of dollars in revenues, came from out of state); Construction Aggregate Transp., 
Inc. v. Florida Rock Indus., 710 F.2d 752, 768 (11th Cir. 1983) (interference with local truck-
ing company's hauling contract created a substantial effect on interstate commerce by 
preventing its purchase of rigs from out-of-state supplier); Palmer v. Roosevelt Lake Log 
Owners Ass'n, Inc., 651 F.2d 1289, 1291-94 (9th Cir. 1981) (interference with family log sal-
vaging business which could supply $35,000 worth of timber per year to mills selling lumber 
out of state created a substantial effect on interstate commerce); Crane v. Intermountain 
Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715, 725 (lOth Cir. 1980) (en bane) (excluding one pathologist 
from a hospital might create a substantial effect on interstate commerce by virtue of his loss 
of out-of-state patients and inability to make out-of-state purchases of medical supplies); 
Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 539-41 (5th Cir_ 1978) (in-
terference with an abortion clinic's attempts to obtain a doctor's services created a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce when the clinic received approximately $26,000 in fees 
from out-of-state patients and spent around $10,000 for out-of-state equipment), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 924 (1979); Gough v. Rossmoor Corp., 487 F.2d 373, 378 (9th Cir. 1973) (in-
terference with one retailer's sales of carpets from out of state to residences in one subdivi-
sion created a substantial effect on interstate commerce; $50,000 in damages suffered). 
Moreover, significant authority suggests quantification is unnecessary for showing a sub-
stantial effect. See, e.g., McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 444 U.S. 232, 233 
(1980); Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 523-24 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
412 U.S. 950 (1973). Quantification may also be unnecessary to show substantial effect when 
applied to foreign commerce. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 
224 n.59 (1940) (the amount of interstate or foreign trade involved not material); United 
States v. Bayer Co., 135 F. Supp. 65, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (same); United States v. General 
Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 891 (D.N.J. 1949) (substantial effect found even though no show-
ing as to extent of commerce restrained). 
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the intrastate cases, there is no reason to believe that the term 
means something different when applied to foreign conduct.130 
The final question is whether comity precludes application of 
the Sherman Act to overseas bribery by foreign companies. Courts 
recently began following a balancing approach to extraterritorial 
application of the Sherman Act under which they determine 
whether a foreign nation's interest that U.S. law not apply to con-
duct within that nation's borders outweighs the U.S. interest cre-
ated by the conduct's effect on U.S. imports or exports. The Ninth 
Circuit introduced this approach in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. 
Bank of America.131 Other circuits, while varying in their precise 
formulation, followed suit.132 The legislative history of the Export 
Trading Company Act shows that Congress did not intend to pre-
clude the use of this approach as long as a direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect exists. 133 
In weighing these interests, courts examine a number of factors. 
These include: (1) the degree of conflict between U.S. and foreign 
law or policy; (2) the nationality of the parties; (3) the relative sig-
nificance of effects in the United States as opposed to elsewhere; 
(4) whether the defendant intended to affect U.S. commerce or, if 
not, whether the effect was foreseeable; (5) the extent of any activ-
130. Timberlane Lumber Co. u. Bank of America noted that the intrastate cases do not 
require the same analysis as do the cases of extraterritorial application. The latter raise 
considerations of international comity. But this is an issue different from what quantity of 
effect should be deemed substantial. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 
597, 612 (9th Cir. 1976). 
131. Id. at 613-15. In Timberlane Lumber, the court replaced the direct and substantial 
effects standard with a three-part test for jurisdiction over foreign commerce: first, whether 
there was an intent to affect the foreign commerce of the United States; second, whether 
that effect constituted an actionable restraint of trade under the Sherman Act; and finally, 
after balancing foreign and U.S. interests, whether the United States should assert jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 615. As formulated, the Timberlane Lumber test does not survive the Export 
Trading Company Act. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text. 
132. See, e.g., In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1255-56 (7th Cir. 1980) (al-
though not requiring consideration of all balancing factors when defendants were recalci-
trant); National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1981) (al-
though disagreeing with the statement of the effects test contained in the first two parts of 
the Timberlane Lumber formulation); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 
869-70 (lOth Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Con-
goleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979). But see Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian 
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (comity considerations are limited where 
fundamentally prejudicial to domestic interests). 
133. H.R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 2487, 2498. 
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ity within the United States; (6) the enforceability of any remedy 
ordered; (7) the availability of a remedy abroad; (8) the effect of 
exercising jurisdiction on foreign relations; (9) the U.S. reaction if 
the roles were reversed; (10) whether the relief demanded will sub-
ject the defendant to conflicting requirements under U.S. and for-
eign law; and (11) the impact of any relevant treaties.13" Of these 
factors, the degree of conflict between U.S. and foreign law is the 
most critical. 13~ Indeed, if the nation where the conduct occurs also 
prohibits it, comity concerns are substantially abated. 136 
Comity should not be an obstacle to application of the Sherman 
Act to overseas bribery. Unlike much of the conduct condemned 
by the Sherman Act/37 virtually all nations prohibit bribery.138 Ad-
mittedly, some countries do not recognize a cause of action for 
competitors injured by bribes.139 But this fact strengthens rather 
than weakens the argument for application of U.S. law. Lack of 
enforceable remedies for U.S. firms under foreign law is one of the 
134. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976). 
135. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d at 614-15. 
136. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d at 1302 (Adams, J., con-
curring) ("It is only when foreign law requires conduct inconsistent with that mandated by 
the Sherman Act that problems of international comity become significant.") (emphasis in 
original). Two recent decisions concluding that the Sherman Act should reach overseas con-
duct did so in large part because of the absence of any demonstrated conflict with foreign 
law. See Industrial lnv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884 (5th Cir. 1982), va-
cated, 460 U.S. 1007, reaff'd per curiam on remand, 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 961 (1983); Daishowa Int'l v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 
64,774, at 71,789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1982). 
137. See generally 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad § 
4.03 (2d ed. 1981) (discussing less stringent foreign antitrust policies). 
138. See supra note 4; see also Lowe, The Problems of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Eco-
nomic Sovereignty and the Search for a Solution, 34 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 724, 734 (1985) 
("Extraterritorial claims are more likely to be acceptable when used in service of legislation 
upholding generally-held values, such as personal safety and perhaps the prevention of cor-
rupt practices, than when used to advance more parochial policies, as is the case in much 
competition, tax and export administration legislation."). 
139. Unfair competition statutes in both Switerland and West Germany define bribery as 
an unfair practice and provide competitors with a cause of action. See Loi federale sur la 
concurrence deloyale, art. 1, para. 2(e), Systematische Sammlung des Bundesrechts 241, 
Recueil systematique du droit federal 241, Raccolta sistematica del diritto federale 241 
(Switz.) (Federal Unfair Competition Act); Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb §§ 12, 
13, 1909 RGBl 499, 502 (as amended) (W. Ger.) (Act Against Unfair Competition). Other 
nations have laws providing competitors with a cause of action for unfair competition, but 
not expressly stating that bribery constitutes such an act. See, e.g., Z. Kitagawa, Doing Busi-
ness in Japan §§ 6.02, 11.03 (1984); Wengler, Laws Concerning Competition and Conflict of 
Laws, 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 167, 168 (1955). 
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factors courts consider under the balancing test. The presence of 
this factor weighs in favor of asserting jurisdiction by increasing 
U.S. interest. 14° For example, in Daishowa I nternatfonal, the dis-
trict court decided to exercise jurisdiction primarily because of an 
apparent lack of conflict between U.S. and Japanese law concern-
ing the legality of the Japanese firms' conduct coupled with the 
absence of any remedy under Japanese law for the U.S. firm. 141 In 
such a situation, providing additional remedies for conduct con-
demned where it occurs complements local enforcement efforts. 142 
Thus, comity should not preclude jurisdiction when the country in 
which the bribe occurs prohibits bribery but grants no cause of ac-
tion for injured competitors. There is less conflict, and hence even 
fewer comity concerns, when the country recognizes such a cause of 
action but does not provide for recovery of treble damages as does 
the United States.143 
C. The Federal Trade Commission Act 
Section 5 of the FTC Act proscribes unfair conduct "in or affect-
140. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1979) 
(availability of a foreign remedy is one factor in balancing test); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. 
Bank of America, 574 F. Supp. 1453, 1470-71 (N.D. Cal 1983) (one factor in convincing the 
court to dismiss under the comity test was that the plaintiff availed himself of the full 
opportunity to litigate the issue in Honduras), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985); 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 137, § 6.19 (discussing 
the balancing test for United States assertion of jurisdiction). 
141. Daishowa Int'l v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 64,774, at 
71,789-90 (N.D. Cal. 1982). 
142. This is the reasoning behind recognizing a private cause of action for violation of 
U.S. regulatory statutes. See Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 
(1985) (precluding plaintiff's private cause of action under securities laws would interfere 
with enforcement of those laws); J.l. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (recognizing a 
private cause of action under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
143. See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 19 com-
ment c, illus. 3 (1965) (a nation may apply its own law on the measure of damages in private 
adjudication concerning conduct prohibited where it occurred even if the nation lacked ju-
risdiction to proscribe the conduct). But see Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 
11, § 6 (British statute providing defendants a cause of action to recover the portion of 
foreign multiple damage awards exceeding the compensatory amount). The British explain 
their opposition to treble damages on two grounds. Letter from British Embassy, supra note 
97. The first is the encouragement such damages provide to private plaintiffs who will not 
consider competing national policies before bringing suit. Given the lack of competing na-
tional policies regarding bribery (as opposed to cartels and similar behavior regulated by the 
Sherman Act), this rationale is inapposite here. The second expressed concern is double 
jeopardy. The British act, however, does not appear particularly tailored to such a concern. 
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ing commerce."1"" The Act, in turn, defines "commerce" to include 
trade with foreign nations.1" 11 This means that unfair conduct, such 
as bribery, which impedes U.S. export opportunities comes within 
the literal reach of the section. us Far fewer cases involving extra-
territorial conduct, however, have been brought under the FTC 
Act than under the Sherman Act. Still, the FTC has prosecuted a 
number of firms for engaging in activities overseas which 
prejudiced their U.S. competitors.~"7 This includes actions against 
businesses committing bribery abroad. as 
These prosecutions, however, were against U.S. companies.U9 
The court in Branch v. FTC, 1110 the leading case involving extrater-
ritorial application of the FTC Act, emphasized this fact. Indeed, 
the pre-1975 language of section 5 may have effectively limited its 
reach to U.S. firms. Prior to 1975, the section only reached conduct 
"in commerce. "1111 The Supreme Court held this to mean that the 
unfair conduct must be committed by a business involved in buy-
ing or selling goods or services between the states or between the 
United States and foreign nations.1112 It was not enough that the 
144. FTC Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982). 
145. Id. § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 44 (1982). 
146. Indeed, to the extent a company engaged in export trade from the United States 
commits an unfair act against another U.S. exporter, Congress is even more explicit in pro-
viding jurisdiction. Section 4 of the Webb-Pomerene Export Company Act, ch. 50, § 4, 40 
Stat. 517, amended the FTC Act to prohibit unfair methods of competition used in export 
trade against domestic competitors even if done outside the country. 15 U.S.C. § 64 (1982). 
Since the entire thrust of the Webb-Pomerene Act concerns the regulation of U.S. exporters, 
no significance can be attached to the failure of section 4 to go beyond these companies. 
147. See, e.g., Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944) (false advertising in Latin 
America by correspondence school misrepresenting itself as accredited); FTC v. Nestle's 
Food Co., 2 F.T.C. 171 (1919) (false advertising by exporter of milk to Mexico seeking to 
gain advantage over U.S. competitors). 
148. See In re McDonnell Douglas Corp., 92 F.T.C. 976 (1978) (consent order requiring 
ending payments to foreign officials to secure purchase of aircraft); In re Boeing Co., 92 
F.T.C. 972 (1978) (same); In re Lockheed Corp., 92 F.T.C. 968 (1978) (same); FTC v. United 
Indigo & Chern. Co., 3 F.T.C. 425 (1921) (enjoined commercial bribery in the United States 
and abroad). 
149. But see FTC v. United Indigo & Chern. Co., 3 F.T.C. 425 (1921) (enjoined British 
corporation headquartered in the United States). 
150. Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944). Branch upheld a cease and desist order 
against a correspondence school which used fraudulent practices to sell courses in Latin 
America. In finding section 5 of the FTC Act applicable, the court emphasized both that a 
U.S. citizen perpetrated the fraud and that the fraud prejudiced other U.S. citizens selling 
courses in the region. Id. at 35. 
151. FTC Act, ch. 311, § 5, 36 Stat. 717, 719 (1914). 
152. See FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941). The Court held that since Congress did 
not explicitly state its intent to regulate intrastate sales which affect interstate competitors, 
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conduct simply affect such trade. lGa 
In a 1975 amendment, 1114 Congress expanded the coverage of sec-
tion 5 to encompass acts "in or affecting commerce."166 The legisla-
tive history of this amendment indicates that its goal was to reach 
local activities which affect interstate trade.1G6 Congress evidently 
did not consider the amended FTC Act's application to overseas 
conduct which affects U.S. exports. Nevertheless, the impact of the 
amendment was to make section 5 of the FTC Act coextensive in 
its overseas reach with the Sherman Act. u7 The Export Trading 
Company Act of 1982u8 reinforces the conclusion that section 5 
has the same extraterritorial reach as the Sherman Act. In addition 
to clarifying the application of the Sherman Act to conduct imped-
ing U.S. exports, the 1982 Act engrafted parallel language onto sec-
tion 5. 169 Accordingly, if the Sherman Act covers bribery by foreign 
companies abroad, the FTC Act should as well. 
D. The Robinson-Patman Act 
The prohibitions in section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act ex-
tend only to conduct by parties "engaged in commerce, in the 
course of such commerce. 11160 This language is much more restric-
section 5 of the FTC Act did not bring such activity within the jurisdiction of the FTC. ld. 
at 351. 
153. Id. at 355. 
154. Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. 
No. 93-637, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 2183, 2193 (1975). 
155. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982). 
156. See H.R. Rep. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 7702, 7713 ("It is unrealistic to restrict the jurisdiction of the FTC under 
section 5 of the Act to only interstate transactions."). 
157. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1982) (FTC Act) with 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982) (Sherman 
Act). 
158. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233. 
159. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (1982). Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, as amended by the 
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, § 403, 96 
Stat. 1246, 1246, reads in pertinent part: 
(3) This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of competition involving 
commerce with foreign nations (other than import commerce) unless-
(A) such methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and 
reasonably foreseeable effect-
(i) on commerce which is not commerce with foreign na-
tions, or on import commerce with foreign nations; or 
(ii) on export commerce with foreign nations, of a person 
engaged in such commerce in the United States . . .. 
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1982). 
160. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(c}, 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982). 
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tive than either section 1 of the Sherman Act161 or section 5 of the 
FTC Act as amended.162 As a result, application of section 2(c) to 
overseas bribery by foreign companies involves three issues not 
raised by the other two statutes. 
First, there is some question whether section 2(c) reaches any 
extraterritorial conduct, at least when the conduct does not involve 
a sale to the United States. Since the Robinson-Patman Act is an 
amendment to the Clayton Act, 163 the Clayton Act's definition of 
"commerce" should govern section 2(c). This definition appears to 
contemplate extraterritorial application for it includes "trade or 
commerce . . . with foreign nations. "16• Nevertheless, one com-
mentator argues that section 2(c) should be limited to domestic 
trade (or else imports), since its purpose is to complement section 
2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 1611 Section 2(a),l66 unlike section 
2(c), is expressly limited to price discrimination in the sale of com-
modities for "use, consumption, or resale within the United 
States."167 This argument, however, ignores the difference in lan-
guage between sections 2(a) and 2(c),I68 as well as the definition of 
"commerce" under the Clayton Act.169 Moreover, one of the princi-
pal drafters of the Robinson-Patman Act contradicts the posi-
tion. 170 It is not surprising, therefore, that the only two courts to 
consider the argument rejected it.171 Indeed, in Canadian Inger-
161. See supra note 23. 
162. See supra note 44. 
163. Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, § 1, 49 Stat. 1526, 1526 (1936). 
164. Clayton Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982). 
165. F. Rowe, Price Discrimination Under the Robinson-Patman Act 82 (1962). This ar-
gument is analogous to that made against applying section 2(c) to commercial bribery when 
there is no discriminatory effect. 
166. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). 
167. Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act reads in pertinent part: 
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such 
commerce, either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price between different 
purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality, where either or any of the 
purchases involved in such discrimination are in commerce, where such com-
modities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United States or any 
Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession or other 
place under the jurisdiction of the United States .... 
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) · (1982). 
168. Compare supra note 167 (language of Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a)) with supra note 
59 (language of Robinson-Patman Act § 2(c)). 
169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
170. See W. Patman, The Robinson-Patman Act 208 (1938). 
171. See Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, 227 F. Supp. 829, 833 (N.D. 
Ohio 1964); Baysoy v. Jessop Steel Co., 90 F. Supp. 303, 305 (W.D. Pa. 1950). 
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soll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons/72 the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Ohio applied section 2(c) to 
bribes paid by a U.S. company to a Canadian firm's purchasing 
agent. 173 
Although Canadian Ingersoll-Rand condones the prosecution of 
U.S. firms for bribery abroad under section 2(c), applying that sec-
tion to a foreign company may be more difficult since the defend-
ant must be "engaged in commerce."174 This language requires that 
the defendant make purchases or sales between states or between 
the United States and other nations.176 Still, this language does not 
rule out all actions against overseas competitors who bribe abroad. 
Large foreign firms which compete with U.S. exporters may also 
purchase from or sell goods to the United States, thereby meeting 
the requirement.176 
A third barrier may preclude application of section 2(c) even 
against this class of defendants. Section 2(c) requires that the chal-
lenged conduct occur "in the course of such commerce."~77 The 
narrowest interpretation of this clause requires that the illegal pay-
ment relate to a sale by the defendant which crosses state lines or 
where goods are imported to or exported from the United States, 
i.e., a sale in the flow of commerce.178 This leaves only two situa-
tions in which section 2(c) might arguably apply to overseas brib-
ery by a foreign company. The first is when a foreign company uses 
the bribe to resell goods which it purchased from the United 
States, that is, when the company is a distributor of U.S. products. 
A second and potentially far more common situation is when the 
foreign firm incorporates goods purchased in the United States 
into its own product. 
172. Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, 227 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 
1964). 
173. Id. at 833-34. 
174. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982). 
175. See United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 275-83 
(1975); Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851, 860-61 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. 
denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966). 
176. Indeed, these are the sort of companies over which personal jurisdiction in the 
United States may be most readily obtained. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
177. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(c), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1982). 
178. One district court has applied this construction to section 2(c) in a case involving 
alleged price discrimination on sales of furniture within state lines. See Rohrer v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 60,352, at 66,480 (E.D. Mich. 1975); see also 
Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare Mkts., 587 F.2d 127, 135 n.27 (3d Cir. 1978) (dicta refer-
ring to restrictive interpretations of the Clayton Act and the Robinson-Patman Act). 
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Some authority suggests that local sales of products made from 
ingredients purchased out of state are, by virtue of that fact, still 
in the flow of commerce.179 Most courts, however, hold that the 
transformation of goods into a new product interrupts the flow, 
thereby making the subsequent sale entirely local or foreign. 180 
Even when the defendant does not physically alter the goods but 
simply resells them, courts generally hold that the resale is not in 
the flow of commerce. 181 Courts do make exceptions when the de-
fendant purchases the goods to fill the special order of the ultimate 
customer, pursuant to an understanding with the final buyer, or 
based upon the anticipated needs of specific consumers.182 These 
exceptions leave little room for section 2(c) to apply to a bribe 
made abroad by a foreign firm. 
Fortunately, there is support for a broader interpretation of the 
"in the course of such commerce" clause based on the difference 
between sections 2(a) and 2(c). Courts hold that section 2(a) re-
179. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. American Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 525 (9th Cir.) (intrastate 
sales of filled milk may be in the flow of commerce for Sherman Act jurisdiction when the 
milk was made from ingredients (except for the water) purchased out of state), cert. denied, 
412 U.S. 950 (1973); Dean Milk Co. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 696, 715 (7th Cir. 1968) (intrastate 
sales of processed milk were in the flow of commerce for the purpose of section 2(a) of the 
Robinson·Patman Act when the processor purchased some of the raw milk out of state). In 
Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12 (6th Cir. 1943), the court 
noted that the plaintiff power company turned the defendant's coal into energy which it 
then sold out of state. The court suggested that this alone would be sufficient to meet the 
commerce requirement of section 2(c). Id. at 17. This was merely dicta, however, since the 
coal sales themselves crossed state lines. Moreover, it is unclear whether the court was rely-
ing on a "flow of commerce" or an "affecting commerce" analysis. See id. at 16-17. 
180. See, e.g., Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 178-81 (lOth Cir.), cert. denied, 408 
U.S. 928 (1972); Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851, 860 (9th Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Central Ice Cream Co. v. Golden Rod Ice Cream Co., 287 
F.2d 265, 267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961); Miles v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
360 F. Supp. 869, 871 (E.D. Wis. 1973). 
181. See, e.g., Hampton v. Graff Vending Co., 516 F.2d 100 (5th Cir. 1975); Cliff Food 
Stores v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 209-10 (5th Cir. 1969). But see Northern California 
Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379, 386-87 (9th Cir.) (retailers' resale of 
prescription drugs shipped from out of state does not stop the flow of interstate commerce 
before the drugs reach consumers), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962). 
182. See, e.g., Hampton v. Graff Vending Co., 516 F.2d 100, 102-03 (5th Cir. 1975) (plain-
tiff did not establish that intrastate resales of chewing gum fell within any of the three 
circumstances in which such sales are considered to be in interstate commerce); Cliff Food 
Stores v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203, 210 (5th Cir. 1969) (listing exceptions to the general 
rule that retail sales of groceries to the general public are not in commerce); see also Walling 
v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 568-69 (1943) (goods procured from out of state by a 
local merchant to fulfill prior orders or contracts with customers are "in commerce" within 
the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1940)). 
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quires that one of the sales involved in the price discrimination 
must cross state lines.183 Section 2(a), however, contains a third ju-
risdiction clause that is not found in section 2(c). In addition to 
requiring that the defendant be "engaged in commerce" and "in 
the course of such commerce," section 2(a) also requires that "ei-
ther or any of the purchases involved" must be "in commerce."18" 
This added language distinguishes cases involving section 2(a).186 
More significantly, this clause carries a negative implication con-
cerning the prior provision. Interpreting the language of section 
2(c) to require that the illegal payment occur in the flow of com-
merce renders the third jurisdiction clause in section 2(a) 
redundant. 186 
Courts have suggested two other interpretations of the "in the 
course of such commerce" clause which give it a meaning different 
from the third jurisdiction clause in section 2(a) and which could 
make section 2(c) applicable to overseas bribery by foreign compa-
nies. The Ninth Circuit's opiriion in Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nel-
son & Sons187 provides one theory. Rangen involved bribery by a 
company making interstate sales, but the sales obtained through 
the bribes did not cross state lines.188 Nevertheless, the court held 
that the bribes occurred during the course of the defendant's inter-
183. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 (1974); Borden Co. v. 
FTC, 339 F.2d 953, 955 (7th Cir. 1964). 
184. Robinson-Patman Act § 2(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1982). 
185. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. at 200 ("[T]he Courts of Appeals 
have read the language requiring that 'either or any of the purchases inuolued in such 
discrimination [be] in commerce' to mean that § 2(a) applies only where ' "at least one of 
the two transactions which, when compared, generate a discrimination .. . cross[es] a state 
line."' ") (emphasis added) (alterations in original); Borden Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 953, 955 
(7th Cir. 1964) ("[U]nless the third commerce requirement of Section 2(a) is to be given no 
effect whatever, the Commission's burden of establishing jurisdiction cannot be discharged 
merely by a showing that respondent is an interstate concern or that it makes interstate 
sales not involved in the challenged discrimination.") (emphasis added) (quoting FTC 
Comm'r Elman with approval). 
186. See Clausen & Sons v. Theo. Hamm Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148, 156 (D. Minn. 
1967) (the "in commerce" language of section 2(a) implies that an activity can be in the 
course of interstate commerce without involving interstate transactions), rev'd on other 
grounds, 395 F.2d 388 (Sth Cir. 1968). However, the court in Rohrer v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 1975-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 60,352, at 66,480 (E.D. Mich. 1975), held that section 2(c) 
has the same jurisdictional reach as section 2(a) since the purpose of section 2(c) is to com-
plement section 2(a). As noted earlier, this reasoning ignores the difference in language be-
tween the two provisions. 
187. Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 
383 u.s. 936 (1966). 
188. ld. at 860. 
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state commerce, reasoning that the local sales obtained through 
bribes aided the defendant in its interstate competition. 189 In sup-
port of this position, the Rangen court quoted from the Supreme 
Court's decision in Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co. 190 Moore in-
volved a section 2(a) claim against a bakery which lowered its price 
for in-state sales below its out-of-state prices. In finding that sec-
tion 2(a) could reach this conduct, the Court discussed the need to 
prevent nationwide companies from subsidizing local price wars 
with profits from interstate operations. 191 The Rang en court 
turned this around to argue that if the Robinson-Patman Act can 
reach local price cutting because it is aided by interstate sales, 
then it can also reach local bribery because it may aid interstate 
sales.192 
This approach is flawed in two respects. First, it is not clear that 
the Moore opinion is discussing the statutory requirements of sec-
tion 2(a) when referring to the dangers of subsidizing local price 
wars with profits from interstate operations.193 Moreover, whatever 
the merits of the legal logic in Rangen, its factual predicate is un-
certain. 194 The Court never explains how the local sales aided the 
defendant's interstate efforts. There is no indication, for instance, 
that profits from the local sales subsidized below-cost pricing in 
the interstate market. Nevertheless, Rangen provides the founda-
tion for an argument against foreign bribers who also sell in the 
United States. A U.S. competitor may assert, with as much author-
ity as the plaintiff in Rangen, that the briber's foreign sales aid its 
competition in the United States. If the bribe involves the same 
product sold by the foreign company in this country and the U.S. 
firm also sells in the United States, the situation is indistinguish-
able from Rangen.19G 
189. ld. at 860-61. 
190. Id. at 861 (quoting Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 119 (1954)). 
191. Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1954). 
192. Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d at 861. 
193. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200 n.17 (1974) (the language in 
Moore "spoke to the commerce power rather than to jurisdiction under § 2(a)"). 
194. See Note, Bribery and Brokerage: An Analysis of Bribery in Domestic and Foreign 
Commerce Under Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 1343, 1356-58 
(1978) (concluding that Rangen provides little factual guidance). 
195. The Ninth Circuit suggested that it still adheres to Rangen's jurisdictional theory. 
See May Dep't Store v. Graphic Process Co., 637 F.2d 1211, 1216 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing 
Rangen for the proposition that the "interstate character" of the plaintiff and its competi-
tor, who allegedly secured business through bribes, "may provide a sufficient commerce 
nexus to meet the jurisdictional requirement"); see also Clausen & Sons v. Theo. Hamm 
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Another possible interpretation of the "in the course of such 
commerce" clause is that it refers to any activity, even a local or 
foreign one, by a firm which engages in commerce if the activity 
affects commerce-in essence, combining the requirement that the 
defendant buy or sell between states or between the United States 
and foreign countries with the effects test. While this interpreta-
tion admittedly does some violence to the actual language of sec-
tion 2(c), there are both cases and sound policy reasons to support 
such a construction. 
Two Supreme Court decisions dealing with the reach of section 3 
of the Clayton Act provide the principal authority. This section 
prohibits anticompetitive exclusive dealing arrangements by any-
one "engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce";196 in 
other words, it has the same jurisdiction clause as section 2(c). The 
issue of the jurisdictional reach of section 3 came before the Su-
preme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co.197 The plaintiff 
and the United States as amicus curiae urged the Court to hold 
that section 3 reaches acts affecting interstate trade even if those 
acts do not occur in the flow of commerce.198 Rather than summa-
rily rejecting the argument, the Court declined to resolve the issue 
because there was no evidence that the defendant's activities had 
any effect on interstate trade. 199 Although expressing doubts about 
such a broad interpretation, the Court noted that its decision in 
Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States200 supports this 
construction. 201 
Standard Oil involved a challenge to exclusive supply contracts 
with operators of service stations both in California, from which 
Brewing Co., 284 F. Supp. 148, 157 (D. Minn. 1967) (following Rangen in construing "in the 
course of such commerce" within the meaning of section 3 of the Clayton Act), rev'd on 
other grounds, 395 F.2d 388 (8th Cir. 1968). 
196. Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). 
197. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974). 
198. ld. at 201-02. The position urged upon the Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving 
Co. went beyond what is suggested here. It also subsumed the "engaged in commerce" 
clause into the effects test. The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in United States v. 
American Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975), precludes such an interpretation. 
In American Building Maintenance, the Court held that the phrase "engaged in com-
merce," used in section 7 of the Clayton Act, means that the company must actually be 
involved in buying or selling goods or services in interstate trade. Id. at 283. This still leaves 
open the meaning of the phrase "in the course of such commerce." 
199. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. at 202. 
200. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). 
201. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. at 202. 
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Standard Oil supplied products, and outside the state.202 The Su-
preme Court rejected the company's argument that the district 
court should have exempted the contracts with California service 
stations from its decree because they only involved intrastate 
sales. 203 In doing so, the Court used an effects on commerce test, 
noting that the contracts precluded out-of-state suppliers from 
selling to the California stations. 20" By using an effects test, the 
Court may only have been following the defendant's lead-as the 
defendant couched its argument in terms of a lack of effect by the 
California contracts on interstate commerce206-and may not have 
focused on the jurisdictional language in section 3. Moreover, one 
commentator argues that the Supreme Court could have reached 
the result on narrower grounds.206 Nevertheless, the holding in 
Standard Oil coalesces perfectly with the notion that any acts, lo-
cal or foreign, by firms which engage in commerce that preclude 
the interstate or foreign trade of competitors meet the requirement 
of occurring "in the course of such commerce."207 Under this read-
ing, section 2(c) applies to overseas bribery by foreign companies 
to the same extent as do the Sherman and FTC Acts except for the 
added requirement that the foreign company purchase from or sell 
to the United States. 
This interpretation of section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act 
and section 3 of the Clayton Act is supported by various policy 
considerations. It enables courts to interpret the Clayton Act and 
202. Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. at 295. 
203. Id. at 314-15. 
204. Id. at 309. 
205. Id. at 304 n.6. 
206. See 3 J.O. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws and Trade Regulation § 12.03[3], at 59 
(1969). 
207. See Fitch v. Kentucky-Tennessee Light & Power Co., 136 F.2d 12, 16-17 (6th Cir. 
1943) (court appears to equate "occurring in the course of commerce" with "affecting com-
merce"). Since Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., lower courts have disagreed over whether 
section 3 reaches contracts which affect commerce, at least if the defendant engages in inter-
state trade, even if the contracts themselves do not involve the sale of goods or services 
between states. Compare Kane v. Martin Paint Stores, 1975-1 Trade Cas. 11 60,176, at 65,576 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (contract between local franchisee and national franchisor violated section 3 
of Clayton Act because of the effect on interstate commerce) with Chatham Condominium 
Ass'ns v. Century Village, Inc., 597 F.2d 1002, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1979) (99-year lease require-
ment occurred during the flow of interstate commerce, thus violating section 3 of Clayton 
Act, because the condominium lessor purchased and sold out-of-state goods and services); 
see also Detroit City Dairy v. Kowalski Sausage Co., 393 F. Supp. 453, 476 (E.D. Mich 1975) 
(section 3 of the Clayton Act does not require an "actual interstate sale," but "only that the 
illegal activity occur in the course of interstate commerce"). 
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the Sherman Act in a more complementary fashion, which is con-
sistent with the overall purpose of the Clayton Act.208 It also 
makes the application of section 2(c) to overseas bribery more ra-
tional. Under Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & 
Sons,209 foreign companies may sue U.S. nationals for bribery com-
mitted abroad.210 Under the narrow interpretation of section 2(c)'s 
jurisdiction clause, however, U.S. nationals may not sue foreign 
bribers. This is anomolous in that the section then applies when 
the United States has a limited interest in protecting competitors 
from bribery, but does not apply when the United States has a 
substantial interest. The broader interpretation avoids this result. 
IV. CoMPLICATIONs CAUSED BY THE INVOLVEMENT OF FoREIGN 
GOVERNMENTS IN OVERSEAS BRIBERY 
When considering whether to apply U.S. law to bribery commit-
ted overseas by non-U.S. nationals, it is also necessary to consider 
the role of foreign governments. Foreign governments, acting 
through state-owned enterprises, may engage in bribery which dis-
advantages U.S. firms. More commonly, however, the foreign gov-
ernment becomes involved when its official receives a bribe. In the 
former case, the briber might assert the defense of sovereign im-
munity. In the latter situation, the briber might seek shelter be-
hind the act of state doctrine, the sovereign compulsion defense, or 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. But, as will be seen, none of these 
defenses should normally present insurmountable barriers to pros-
ecution for bribery under U.S. antitrust laws. 
A. Sovereign Immunity 
When a foreign government owns a company which made a 
bribe, the company may assert the defense of sovereign immunity. 
Although such a · company is a government instrumentality,211 the 
208. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 201 (1974) (sections 3 and 
7 of the Clayton Act "were intended to complement the Sherman Act and to facilitate 
achievement of its purposes"); see also United States v. E.l. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 
U.S. 586, 589 (1957) (section 7 of the Clayton Act is intended "to arrest in its incipiency" 
substantial lessening of competition from corporate acquisitions, and restraints or monopo-
lies likely to result from an acquisition). 
209. Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, 227 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Ohio 
1964). 
210. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text. 
211. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act defines an "agency or instrumentality of a 
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defense should not succeed in this context. The Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act212 (FSIA) denies immunity to a government's com-
mercial activity.213 The use of bribery to make a sale or otherwise 
gain a competitive advantage easily comes within the perimeters of 
commercial activity. 214 · 
B. The Act of State Doctrine 
The act of state doctrine is a more formidable defense. It man-
dates that domestic courts abstain from adjudicating the validity 
of actions taken by foreign governments on their own territory. 216 
Neither international law nor the Constitution require such ab-
stention; rather, this is a self-imposed rule of judicial restraint.216 
Early cases suggest that it was founded upon considerations of in-
ternational comity. 217 More recent pronouncements by the Su- . 
preme Court link the rule, however, to a separation of powers con-
cern, namely the need not to interfere with the executive branch in 
the conduct of foreign policy.218 The act of state doctrine differs 
foreign state" as 
any entity-
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and 
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a 
majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state 
or political subdivision thereof, and 
(3) which is neither a citizen of a State of the United States ... , nor created 
under the laws of any third country. 
28 u.s.c. § 1603(b) (1982). 
212. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), Pub. L. No. 94·583, 90 Stat. 2891 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982)). 
213. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1982). 
214. Cf. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384 (D. Del. 1978) (a Polish 
government-controlled entity involved in the manufacture and saie of golf carts under 
agreements with U.S. distributors to sell only in assigned territories was engaged in com-
mercial activity under the FSIA). 
215. See generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (applying 
the act of state doctrine to a foreign expropriation, even when the expropriation allegedly 
violated customary international law); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897) (act of 
state doctrine barred inquiry into acts of a foreign military commander whose government 
was later recognized by the United States). 
216. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28. The rule also binds state 
courts. Id. at 425-27. 
217. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1918) (the act of state 
doctrine "rests at last upon the highest considerations of international comity and expedi-
ency"); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. at 252 ("Every sovereign State is bound to respect 
the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit 
in judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its own territory."). 
218. See, e.g., First Nat'! City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765-68 
(1972); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 431-33. 
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from sovereign immunity in that private as well as governmental 
defendants may invoke it as a defense. 219 
The case of Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum 
Corp. 220 demonstrates how the act of state doctrine may impede 
the prosecution of individuals who bribe foreign officials. Clayco 
Petroleum Corp. ("Clayco") brought suit against Occidental Petro-
leum Corp. ("Occidental") for violating the Sherman and Robin-
son-Patman Acts after SEC-imposed disclosure revealed that Occi-
dental had obtained an offshore oil concession (which Clayco 
claimed was promised to it) by bribing the petroleum minister of 
Umm AI Qaywayn in the United Arab Emirates.221 The district 
court dismissed the suit on act of state grounds and the Ninth Cir-
cuit affirmed, reasoning that the underlying dispute involved a sov-
ereign decision on how to exploit the sheikdom's natural re-
sources. 222 It then held that the act of state doctrine forbids 
inquiry into whether bribery motivated this decision. 223 
Despite this result, most actions involving bribery of foreign offi-
cials should survive an act of state challenge. Whether the defense 
applies in a given case depends upon an evaluation of all the facts 
and circumstances.224 When dealing with bribery, the most impor-
tant facts are the nature of the government action which the briber 
obtained and the impact of the bribe itself on the policies behind 
judicial abstention in this area. 
Traditionally, the act of state doctrine has been used when the 
foreign government expropriated property.226 Indeed, almost all of 
the Supreme Court decisions invoking the doctrine have involved 
219. Williams v. Curtiss·Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 302-03 (3d Cir. 1982); International 
Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982). 
220. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983) 
(per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). 
221. The oil minister was also the son of the ruler. Id. at 405. 
222. Id. at 408. 
223. I d. at 407-08. In some ways this case belongs in the category "turn about is fair 
play." Several years earlier Occidental lost the concession when Clayco convinced the ruler 
of neighboring Sharja to assert jurisdiction over the waters in question. Occidental sued 
Clayco and its confederates but the suit was dismissed on act of state grounds. Occidental 
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), atf'd per curiam, 
461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). 
224. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) (declining to lay 
down "an inflexible and all-encompassing rule"). 
225. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 469 com-
ment c (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986). 
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expropriations. 226 In these cases, the policy reasons behind the rule 
are most evident. Expropriations typically lead the injured parties 
to seek help from the executive branch, which endeavors through 
diplomatic channels to obtain compensation.227 Judicial involve-
ment in determining the legality of the seizure can easily embar-
rass these diplomatic efforts. A decision that the taking is valid 
could undermine State Department negotiations by offending the 
foreign government. Even a ruling that the taking is invalid could 
disrupt efforts to negotiate a diplomatic solution.228 Similar con-
cerns do not readily apply to most of the types of actions obtained 
by payoffs to foreign officials. 
Bribes can be directed toward three types of government action 
which prejudice competitors. 229 They may be employed to obtain a 
government procurement contract. 230 They may also be used to ob-
tain access to resources controlled by the government.231 Finally, 
they may be directed at obtaining regulation or other government 
action which impedes a competitor's ability to do business in a 
country. For example, the briber may seek a patent or other grant 
of monopoly rights. 232 Alternatively, the briber may want the local 
226. See First Nat'! City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 
(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 
U.S. 297 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); American Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). Two Supreme Court decisions concerning the act of 
state doctrine do not involve expropriations. Underhill v. Hernandez, 108 U.S. 250 (1897), 
involved the detention of a U.S. citizen. This, however, raises the same policy concerns as 
expropriations. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976), 
involved the refusal to repay a debt. The Court held that the act of state doctrine did not 
apply. 
227. Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 41 comment 
b (1965). 
228. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432. 
229. See generally Hearings on the Activities of American Multinational Corporations 
Abroad Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy of the House Comm. on 
International Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 87-97 (1975) [hereinafter Hearings on Ameri-
can Multinationals] (statement of Donald I. Baker, Deputy Assistant to the Att'y Gen., An-
titrust Div., Dep't of Justice) (discussing how the Sherman Act might apply to various ex-
amples of bribery in foreign commerce). 
230. See, e.g., Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981); Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851 (9th 
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966). 
231. See, e.g., Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). 
232. Cf. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979) (foreign 
patents allegedly obtained through fraud). 
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authorities to take action directly against a foreign competitor.233 
A number of lower courts have considered whether government 
procurement decisions raise act of state concerns. In General Air-
craft Corp. v. Air America, Inc., 23• the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia held that the doctrine bars any 
suit which requires examining the motives for a foreign govern-
ment's purchasing decision.23G Most courts, however, have allowed 
cases to proceed despite claims of unlawful efforts to influence for-
eign government procurement. For example, in Williams v. Cur-
tiss- Wright Corp./36 the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's dis-
paragement and unfair competition had caused it to lose sales of 
spare parts for military jets to foreign governments.237 Neverthe-
less, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held 
that the act of state doctrine did not preclude review.238 Similarly, 
in Sage International, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co.,239 the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held 
that the act of state doctrine did not prevent judicial consideration 
of the propriety of sales of armored cars to foreign governments.uo 
Neither Curtiss- Wright nor Sage International hold that pro-
curement is always, or even normally, outside the reach of the act 
233. See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909) (seizure of 
plaintiff's plantation); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 
1976) (enforcement of security interest against property of plaintiff's business). Bribes 
might also be used to obtain other favorable treatment from government officials, such as 
relaxed taxation or regulation of the briber's business. This, however, does not directly 
prejudice competitors. 
234. General Aircraft Corp. v. Air America, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1979). 
235. Id. at 7. General Aircraft Corp. alleged that the Central Intelligence Agency and 
various companies connected with it conspired to monopolize the market for short takeoff 
and landing aircraft. Id. at 5. In pursuit of this conspiracy, they purportedly disparaged the 
plaintiff's airplanes and influenced foreign governments not to purchase from the plaintiff. 
Id. Under these peculiar facts, where the executive branch ostensibly influenced the foreign 
government procurement decision, it may well be plausible that litigation would embarrass 
the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs. 
236. Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982). 
237. Id. at 302. 
238. Id. at 304-05 (the doctrine "should not be applied to thwart legitimate American 
regulatory goals in the absence of a showing that adjudication may hinder international 
relations"). 
239. Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
240. Id. at 909. In Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983), the Ninth Circuit also faced a lawsuit involving foreign 
government procurement. The plaintiff, however, did not contest whether procurement con-
stituted an act of state. Instead, it argued that the purchasing decisions did not need to be 
examined and, therefore, the act of state doctrine did not bar the action. Id. at 1047. The 
court accepted this argument for the purpose of denying summary judgment. Id. at 1059. 
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of state doctrine. But, there is a strong argument for this conclu-
sion. As noted above, the FSIA does not confer immunity upon 
the commercial actions of foreign governments. 2'n The FSIA 
prescribes that the nature of an act, not its purpose, determines 
whether it is commercial. 242 In this sense, the test is objective. The 
legislative history of the FSIA indicates that an activity is commer-
cial in nature if it is of the type that a private person might nor-
mally engage in for profit.243 Under this analysis, entering into pro-
curement contracts would be considered commercial since private 
individuals normally contract to buy goods.244 This may even go as 
far as to overrule pre-FSIA cases which held that military procure-
ment, including procurement of non-weapons, was not commer-
cial, 2411 since those decisions applied a subjective test focusing upon 
the purpose for which the government purchased the items. 246 
The fact that procurement should be considered commercial for 
purposes of sovereign immunity affects the availability of the act 
of state doctrine as a defense. In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. 
Republic of Cuba,2" 7 a plurality of the Supreme Court (joined by 
four Justices) held that commercial activities are not covered by 
the doctrine.2" 8 But, since this holding did not command a major-
241. See supra note 213 and accompanying text. 
242. 28 u.s.c. § 1603(d) (1982). 
243. Hearings on H.R. 11315 Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and Govern-
ment Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976) [here· 
inafter Hearings on H.R. 11315] (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser of the Dep't of 
State); H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong.-, 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & 
Admin. News 6604, 6615; see also United Euram Corp. v. USSR, 461 F. Supp. 609, 610-11 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing House Judiciary Committee Report which stated that it is the com-
mercial nature of an activity or transaction that is essential). But see In re Sedco, Inc., 543 
F. Supp. 561, 565 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (not every act done by a foreign state that could be done 
by an individual is "commercial activity" for the purposes of the FSIA since "[s]uch a world 
view unrealistically denies the existence of other types of governments and economic sys-
tems"), vacated upon reconsideration of evidence, 610 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. Tex. 1984). 
244. Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 309 (2d 
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Hearings on H.R. 11315, supra note 243, at 51 
(statement of Bruno Ristau, Chief of the Foreign Litig. Sec. of the Civil Div., Dep't of Jus-
tice); H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 243, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad-
min. News at 6615. 
245. See, e.g., Aerotrade, Inc. v. Republic of Haiti, 376 F. Supp. 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
246. National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 641 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 243, at 
16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 6615. But cf. Williams v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that military procurement is not 
commercial). 
247. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). 
248. Justice Stevens joined only the portion of the Court's opinion which found no sover-
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ity of the Court, lower courts have been uncertain of the law on 
this point.249 Nevertheless, the commercial exception enacted in 
the FSIA logically compels that a similar exception to the act of 
state doctrine be recognized. The FSIA embodies an implicit legis-
lative judgment that suits against foreign governments based upon 
their commercial activities are not detrimental to U.S. foreign pol-
icy interests.2110 To dismiss such suits on the ground that they re-
eign action by Cuba to repudiate the debt a t issue. Id. at 715 (Stevens, J., concurring). Four 
justices dissented. 
249. The Second and Fifth Circuits have treated the exception as established. This, how-
ever, was only in dicta as the courts went_ on to find it inapplicable to the facts at hand. See 
Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 327 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir. ), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); see also Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 316 n.38 (2d Cir. 1981) (Nigerian cement procurement did not raise 
an act of state problem), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982). But see Braka v. Bancomer, 
S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 225 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that the issue remains open); Industrial Inv. 
Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 52 (5th Cir. 1979) (same), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 
(1980). The Third and Sixth Circuits have simply expressed their uncertainty. Kalamazoo 
Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 425 
n.3 (6th Cir. 1984); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 302 n.2 (3d Cir. 1982). 
The Ninth Circuit has had the most occasion to address the question. In International Ass'n 
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. 
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982), the court held that the commercial activity exception to sover-
eign immunity, which provided jurisdiction to hear the suit against the OPEC member na-
tions for price fixing, did not dilute the act of state doctrine. In Northrop Corp. v. McDon-
nell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983), the court 
seemed more sympathetic to the exception. It emphasized the distinction suggested in 
OPEC between "seemingly" commercial activities which nevertheless raise act of state con-
cerns and " purely" commercial transactions which ordinarily do not. Id. at 1048 n.25. More 
recently, in Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 408 (9th 
Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984), the court stated that the issue 
remained open. While the courts of appeals equivocate, several district courts support the 
exception. See Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 907 (E.D. Mich. 1981) 
("clear trend" toward recognizing exception); Behring Int'l, Inc. v. Imperial Iranian Air 
Force, 475 F. Supp. 396, 401 (D.N.J. 1979); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western 
Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 689-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. 
Supp. 384, 398 (D. Del. 1978) (did not reach issue) (opined that the dissenters in Dunhill 
would have joined the majority if the case had been considered after the passage of the 
FSIA); National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 639-41 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); cf. MOL, Inc. v. Peoples Republic of 
Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79, 85 (D. Or. 1983) (commercial activity exception recognized but 
interpreted narrowly), aff'd on other grounds, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 
1037 (1984). 
250. See Letter from Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser of the Dep't of State, to the Solicitor 
General (Nov. 26, 1975), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 
425 U.S. 682, 706 app. 1, at 707 (1976) ("Implicit in [the commercial exception to sovereign 
immunity] is a determination that adjudications of commercial liability against foreign 
states do not impede the conduct of foreign relations . ... "). · 
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quire review of acts of state contravenes this judgment.2~1 It is 
even more unjustified to preclude actions against private defend-
ants because they involve activities for which the foreign states 
themselves enjoy no immunity. 2~2 As a result, notwithstanding 
General Aircraft Corp. v. Air America, Inc.,2~3 bribery to influence 
government procurement should not be beyond judicial review. 
Government actions granting access to natural resources pose a 
more difficult problem. Clayco Petroleum held that these activities 
are not commercial and are encompassed within the act of state 
defense. 2~4 The conclusion that these activities are not commercial 
seems questionable, however, under the objective test created by 
the FSIA. Private landowners often lease rights to exploit natural 
resources. 2~~ Indeed, in International Association of Machinists 
and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC,266 the Ninth Circuit held that 
the OPEC cartel engaged in commercial activity for purposes of 
the FSIA when it fixed the price for oil sold from member na-
tions.2~7 It is difficult to understand how selecting a buyer or lessor 
of natural resources is fundamentally less commercial than fixing 
251. See H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 243, at 20 n.1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. 
& Admin. News at 6619 n.1; cf. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384,398 (D. 
Del. 1978) (dismissing act of state defense in commercial act case in light of FSIA without 
explicitly recognizing "commercial exception" to the act of state doctrine). But see Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 
1981) (the act of state doctrine is not diluted by the commercial activity exception which 
limits the doctrine of sovereign immunity), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). 
252. It is true that Congress did not expressly engraft a commercial activity exception 
onto the act of state doctrine when it passed the FSIA. Neverthless, no negative implication 
can be taken from this fact. The legislative history suggests Congress was under the impres-
sion that such a step was unnecessary for it thought that the courts had already recognized 
this exception. H.R. Rep. No. 1487, supra note 243, at 20 n.1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code 
Cong. & Admin. News at 6619 n.l. It is also true that sovereign immunity goes to jurisdic: 
tion, while the act of state doctrine raises the issue of justiciability. International Ass'11 of 
Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1360 n.8. However, implicit in 
recognizing jurisdiction over a foreign state's commercial activities must be the assumption 
that this will not create foreign relations problems sufficient to invoke the act of state de-
fense. Otherwise, granting jurisdiction would be pointless. 
253. General Aircraft Corp. v. Air America, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1979); see supra 
notes 234-35 and accompanying text. 
254. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 
1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). 
255. See Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 453 com-
ment b (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981). It may be argued, however, that no private party can lease 
rights, as in Clayco Petroleum, in offshore waters. 
256. International Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). 
257. ld. at 1358. 
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the price for the resources sold. 
If providing access to resources is commercial, the above argu-
ment suggests that the act of state doctrine should normally not 
apply. The OPEC decision, however, rejected this reasoning.268 In-
deed, both the OPEC and Clayco Petroleum opinions seem espe-
cially deferential toward government actions with respect to natu-
ral resources.269 Nevertheless, the situation in OPEC is 
distinguishable from the normal case involving access to raw 
materials. Oil is the primary source of wealth for the nations in 
OPEC and possesses a strategic importance which creates signifi-
cant foreign policy concerns. Absent such unique factors, there is 
little reason to give commercial acts involving natural resources 
particular deference. 260 
Even if there is a commercial exception to the act of state doc-
trine, it will not apply to certain government activities which are 
uniquely sovereign such as granting monopoly rights or taking 
steps against the briber's competitor.261 Nevertheless, not every 
non-commercial act procured through bribery raises act of state 
concerns. The presence of such concerns may depend upon anum-
ber of factors, including whether the government action is carried 
out formally,262 whether the action rises above the ministerial 
level,263 and whether any other evidence indicates that the action 
258. Id. at 1358-62. 
259. See also In re Sedco, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 561, 564-66 (S.D. Tex. 1982) ("commercial 
activity" exception to FSIA was given a narrow reading in a case involving Mexico's offshore 
oil exploration), vacated upon reconsideration of evidence, 610 F. Supp. 306 (S.D. Tex. 
1984). 
260. Compare Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979) (act 
of state doctrine did not preclude litigation of timber cutting concession), cert. denied, 445 
U.S. 903 (1980) with MOL, Inc. v. Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79 (D. Or. 1983) 
(act of state doctrine precluded litigation of rhesus monkey capture and export license), 
aff'd on other grounds, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984). 
261. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.) (defendants prevented 
Libyan oil producer from reaching settlement with Libya, resulting in nationalization of the 
oil producer), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977); Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 
F.·Supp. 329, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (denial of importation licenses by Brazilian government is 
uniquely within its sovereign power and thus judicial inquiry into its reasons is precluded). 
262. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695, 706 (1976) 
(no statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Cuban government was involved; only acts of 
governmental appointees who had only commercial authority). 
263. See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293-94 (3d Cir. 
1979) (grant of patents); Forbo-Giubiasco S.A. v. Congoleum Corp., 516 F. Supp. 1210, 1217-
18 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same). But see Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 303 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (emphasis should not be on the ministerial/discretionary dichotomy, but rather 
the effect on U.S. foreign relations). 
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carries out a significant policy of the foreign government which, in 
turn, gives the litigation substantial foreign policy implications.264 
Thus, although influencing a foreign government to expropriate a 
competitor's facilities raises act of state concerns,26~ persuading a 
foreign court to foreclose on a competitor's facilities does not. 266 
In addition to considering the nature of the government act ob-
tained by bribery, it is also necessary to explore the impact of brib-
ery itself upon the purposes of the doctrine. Only by extending it 
beyond its historically recognized form can the doctrine provide 
any defense for a party who pays off a foreign official. As tradition-
ally formulated, the doctrine precludes challenges to the validity of 
a foreign government's actions. 267 A claim based upon payoffs need 
not challenge the validity of the government act; rather, it attacks 
the legality of the methods used by a private party to procure the 
decision.268 In Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.,269 however, the Second Cir-
cuit h~ld that the act of state doctrine bars more than simply liti-
264. See Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 303 (3d Cir. 1982); Timberlane 
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1976). 
265. See American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Hunt v. Mobil 
Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). If the expropriation vio-
lates international law, however, the Hickenlooper Amendment, also called the Sabbatino 
Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982), may prevent the act of state doctrine from 
applying. 
266. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 606-08 (9th Cir. 
1976). 
267. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Underhill v. 
Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897). 
268. See Forbo-Giubiasco S.A. v. Congoleum Corp., 516 F. Supp. 1210, 1218 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981) ("[W]e are not asked to determine the validity of a foreign patent but to determine 
whether the foreign patents were obtained through inequitable conduct."). In Sharon v. 
Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), the court held that the act of state doctrine 
did not apply because there was no challenge to the validity of any officially authorized 
public act. Id. at 544. The parties agreed that the alleged condoning of a civilian massacre 
would be illegal under Israeli law. Id. at 546. 
269. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). See 
also General Aircraft Corp. v. Air America, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 1979) (court 
unable to address the issue of motivation underlying purchasing decisions though conspiracy 
may be involved); Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329, 333 (E.D.N.Y. 
1977) (court precluded from inquiring into the reason for denial of importation licenses); 
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 111 (C.D. Cal. 1971) 
(doctrine bars claim for antitrust injury flowing from foreign sovereign acts allegedly in-
duced and procured by defendant), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 950 (1972). But see Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 53-54 
(5th Cir. 1979) (since neither the validity of regulations nor the legality of behavior of Indo-
nesia was in question, antitrust action was held justiciable), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 
(1980). 
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gation over the validity of a foreign state's conduct; it also pre-
cludes suits which require examining the motivation for the 
conduct. As recognized in Clayco Petroleum, this brings an official 
bribery claim directly within the rule, since the plaintiff must show 
that the payment motivated the government action in order to es-
tablish a causal connection between the bribe and the plaintiff's 
injury. 
The Hunt/Clayco Petroleum line of reasoning has several flaws. 
First, it is difficult to reconcile with Supreme Court decisions. In 
each of the cases where the Court applied the act of state doctrine, 
the plaintiff had challenged the validity of the government ac-
tion. 270 But, in a case where only motivation was at issue, there was 
hardly a consideration of the defense. 271 In United States v. Sisal 
Sales Corp.,212 the Justice Department alleged that the defendants 
had persuaded the Mexican and Yucatan governments to pass dis-
criminatory legislation which forced other buyers of sisal out of the 
market.273 Yet, the Court upheld the complaint.274 Similarly, in 
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,27r> the 
Court distinguished between challenging the validity of a foreign 
government's conduct, which it noted the plaintiff did not do, and 
challenging efforts to influence government action against a 
competitor.276 
It is also questionable whether the policy behind the act of state 
doctrine should preclude examining whether an illegal payment 
motivated the action of a foreign official. The Clayco Petroleum 
opinion correctly notes that inquiry into charges of corruption can 
270. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); United States v. 
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Ricaud v. Ameri-
can Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); 
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 
U.S. 250 (1897); cf. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) 
(plaintiff challenged an informal commercial act of the Cuban government). 
271. More recently, in First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 
462 U.S. 611, 634 n.28 (1983), the Court refused to consider whether the act of state doc· 
trine precluded examining motives as well as validity. 
272. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). 
273. This allegation was central to establishing causality in the Justice Department's case. 
If the defendants did not induce the objectionable legislation, it is difficult to understand 
how they could be liable for the resulting monopoly. 
274. United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. at 276. 
275. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). 
276. Id. at 706. 
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lead to embarrassment.277 The court, however, confuses embarrass-
ment of the official charged with taking a bribe with consternation 
of a foreign government and, in turn, confuses possible discomfort 
of a foreign government with infringement of the exclusive power 
of the executive branch in the conduct of foreign policy. In cases 
such as Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,278 the Supreme 
Court was concerned about the embarrassment of the executive 
when the nation speaks with more than one voice on an issue 
under negotiation with a foreign state. There is no similar concern 
in a case involving foreign bribery unless the executive branch en-
couraged the foreign official to take bribes. Moreover, any resent-
ment toward the United States by an official charged with corrup-
tion could as easily result from accusations printed in the New 
York Times-which will probably have greater exposure-as from 
claims heard in private litigation. Nevertheless, U.S. foreign policy 
manages to survive a free press. 279 
Even if issues of motivation do invoke the act of state doctrine, 
its application still depends upon the nature of the government act 
in question. For example, in denying immunity for commercial ac-
tivity, the FSIA permits litigation directly with the foreign sover-
eign which may call for an examination of its motives.280 This sug-
277. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 
1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). 
278. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Sabbatino constitutes 
the leading case on the act of state doctrine. It is the only recent decision regarding the 
subject where a majority of the Supreme Court agreed on one opinion. The Hickenlooper 
Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982), however, overrules Sabbatino on its precise issue 
by precluding the application of the act of state doctrine if international law has been vio-
lated. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 111-12 (C.D. 
Cal. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972). The 
Hickenlooper Amendment has been narrowly interpreted to preserve the bulk of the Sabba· 
tino reasoning. Id. at 112. 
279. It is difficult to see how much more embarrassment would have occurred in Clayco 
Petroleum given the public disclosure already made by Occidental. Moreover, in Associated 
Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 
(1981), the plaintiff proved foreign corruption at trial and the defendant evidently neglected 
to raise the act of state defense. Yet, contrary to provoking any outcry abroad, the case 
passed virtually unnoticed. The litigation in Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), was anything but unnoticed. The district court, however, rejected the argu-
ment that embarrassment of a friendly government required applying the act of state doc-
trine. Id. at 552-53. Relations between the United States and Israel successfully weathered 
this suit. 
280. See, e.g., Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 907 ·08 (E. D. Mich. 
1981). For example, a breach of contract suit against a foreign government may raise the 
issue of whether it acted in good faith. Cf. U.C.C. §§ 1-201(19), 1-203 (1977) (there is an 
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gests that Congress was not overly concerned with embarrassing 
foreign officials by allowing courts to inquire into the motives for 
their commercial acts even if such an inquiry is inappropriate for 
their uniquely sovereign conduct. Similarly, the mere presence of 
bribery, and resulting possible embarrassment, should not create 
an act of state barrier when the government act is carried out on a 
relatively low level or is ministerial in nature. In Timberlane Lum-
ber Co. v. Bank of America,281 for example, the Ninth Circuit held 
that a judicial foreclosure by the Honduran courts di~ not raise act 
of state concerns despite allegations that the defendants had paid 
off Honduran officials. 282 
Whether issues of motivation otherwise raise act of state con-
cerns, some courts suggest that corruption creates an exception to 
the doctrine. Curiously, this notion also had its genesis in Hunt v. 
Mobil Oil Corp. 283 There, the Second Circuit noted concerns raised 
by the lower court regarding the impact of bribery upon the act of 
state defense. 284 The opinion, however, did not directly address 
these concerns because the plaintiff had made no allegation of 
payoffs. Since Hunt, two United States district courts have ex-
pressed support for a corruption exception,28~ but the Ninth Cir-
cuit rejected it in Clayco Petroleum.286 
Three arguments may be advanced in support of a corruption 
exception. First, it may be argued that the act of a bribed govern-
ment official is not an act of a foreign government. The Supreme 
Court's opinion in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Car-
bon Corp. 287 supports this argument. In Continental Ore, the Ca-
obligation of good faith and fair dealing in every contract or duty and is defined as honesty 
in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned). 
281. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). 
282. ld. at 608. 
283. Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). 
284. Id. at 79. 
285. In Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 690 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), the court held, in the alternative, that charges that the defendant had 
procured favorable actions through corruption and intimidation precluded use of the act of 
state doctrine as a defense. The court in Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 
896, 908 (E.D. Mich. 1981), did not read the plaintiff's complaint as making similar allega-
tions. It noted, however, that such claims would likely preclude use of the doctrine. ld. 
286. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 409 (9th Cir. 
1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). The Fifth Circuit in Compania de 
Gas de Nuevo Laredo v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 
1041 (1983), declined to address whether a corruption exception exists. 
287. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962). 
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nadian government appointed a wholly-owned subsidiary of Union 
Carbide to purchase and allocate all vanadium for Canadian indus-
try during the Second World War.288 Continental Ore charged that 
the Union Carbide subsidiary had refused to purchase vanadium 
from it as part of a conspiracy to eliminate Continental Ore from 
the market.289 In holding that Union Carbide and the other de-
fendants could be held liable for conspiring to boycott Continental 
Ore, the Court indicated that there was no evidence that the Cana-
dian government approved the appointed company's act.290 Simi-
larly, it may be safely presumed that foreign governments do not 
condone their officials taking bribes. Hence the official's corrupt 
conduct should not be attributed to the government. 291 
The universal condemnation of bribery292 provides a second ba-
sis for a corruption exception. The Supreme Court in Sabbatino 
noted that diverging views between nations regarding appropriate 
standards of conduct make judicial abstention particularly appro-
priate. 293 Such divergence is especially apparent on subjects such 
as nationalization, as in Sabbatino, and cartel activities, as in 
OPEC. This reflects the fundamental difference in economic phi-
losophy between nations following a free market approach and 
those favoring state control of industry.29" The lack of interna-
tional consensus renders these subjects more suited to negotiation 
through the executive branch than litigation in the courts. In con-
trast, there is no lack of consensus as to the illegality of bribing 
government officials which would otherwise render diplomatic ne-
gotiations a superior forum for resolving a defeated competitor's 
complaint. 295 
288. Id. at 695. 
289. Id. 
290. ld. at 706. Cf. Filartiga v. Peiia-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[W]e doubt 
whether action by a state official [who kidnapped and tortured to death the plaintiff's son] 
in violation of the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified 
by that government, could properly be characterized as an act of state."); Sharon v. Time, 
Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (defendant specifically alleged that Sharon went 
beyond his authority as representative of Israel). 
291. See Jimenez v. Aristequieta, 311 F.2d 547, 557-58 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 373 
U.S. 914 (1963); Hearings on American Multinationals, supra note 229, at 91 (statement of 
Ronald I. Baker). This presumption should not involve the court in any difficult assessment 
concerning the validity of official acts under local regulations. Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba 
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 n.17 (1964) (noting justiciability problems in determining 
validity of a foreign government's acts). 
292. See supra note 4. 
293. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430. 
294. Id. 
295. McManis, supra note 3, at 238; cf. Filartiga v. Pena-lrala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 
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Finally, in Sage International, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co.,296 the 
district court suggested that the passage of the FCP A implicitly 
mandated the recognition of a corruption exception. 297 Indeed, it 
would hardly make sense for Congress to pass a law criminalizing 
bribery of foreign officials if the act of state doctrine precluded 
prosecutions. 298 The Ninth Circuit rejected this reasoning in 
Clayco Petroleum, finding an essential difference between private 
actions brought under the antitrust laws and government prosecu-
tions brought under the FCPA.299 It noted that private actions lack 
the check provided by prosecutorial discretion against bringing an 
action which might harm U.S. foreign policy interests.300 
There are several proble:q1s with this distinction. First, the legis-
lative history provides some support for an implied private cause 
of action under the FCP A. 301 This fact is inconsistent with the no-
tion that Congress relied on prosecutorial discretion to cure act of 
state concerns when it passed the FCPA. Moreover, the Ninth Cir-
cuit's reasoning takes an overly cynical view of Congress' intent. 
Congress was undoubtedly aware that prosecutorial discretion 
would exist in bringing actions under the FCP A. In some cases, the 
Justice Department or SEC might exercise this discretion with an 
eye to foreign policy. There is no support in the legislative history, 
however, for any claim that Congress passed the FCPA expecting 
enforcement only when the State Department lacked concern 
about offending foreign officials and their governments. Indeed, 
SEC activities prior to the enactment of the FCP A hardly showed 
great sensitivity to preventing embarrassment of high officials of 
friendly nations. 302 Congress was aware of the SEC's record in this 
1980) (international consensus that torture is prohibited); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. 
Supp. 538, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (consensus that condoning civilian massacre would be illegal 
under Israeli or international Jaw). 
296. Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896 (E.D. Mich. 1981). 
297. Id. at 910 n.26. 
298. Prosecution of foreign bribers under the antitrust laws actually presents Jess poten-
tial for embarrassing U.S. interests than exposing bribery by U.S. citizens under the FCPA. 
299. Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 409 (9th Cir. 
1983} (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). 
300. Id. 
301. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1977). But see 123 Cong. Rec. 
38,602 (Dec. 6, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Tower) ("[It is] my understanding that neither the 
Senate nor the conferees expressed any opinion on this issue. "). 
302. See Herlihy & Levine, supra note 3, at 590-94. 
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area and chose it as one of the two agencies charged with enforcing 
the FCP A. 303 
C. Sovereign Compulsion 
Sovereign compulsion provides another possible defense for brib-
ers of foreign officials. A number of courts have suggested that the 
antitrust laws do not proscribe actions which a foreign government 
compels the defendant to perform.304 Accordingly, a briber might 
argue that the payment was not made voluntarily, but rather was 
extorted by a corrupt official. This is much like the defense some-
times asserted under domestic criminal law in response to a charge 
of bribery. 30~ In addition to the obvious evidentiary problems, 
there are several flaws in this defense. 
First, it is questionable whether illegal efforts to extort a bribe 
meet the prerequisites for the sovereign compulsion defense. The 
defense is available when an individual is "required by law" to per-
303. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1982) (conduct declared unlawful by FCPA); 15 U.S.C. § 
78dd-1 (1982) (SEC enforcement power). In Sage Int'l, Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. 
Supp. 896 (E.D. Mich. 1981), the defendants argued that the FCPA did not require examin-
ing the actions of foreign officials since it prohibited offers of bribes even if not accepted. ld. 
at 910 n.26. The district court rejected this argument. It noted that a trial under the FCPA 
might still explore a foreign official's motivation in order to determine whether the offer had 
any chance of success. Id. More significantly, the FCPA prohibits both offers and payments. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(b) (1982). Thus, prosecutors can and have brought actions 
which allege that defendants influenced foreign officials. See, e.g., United States v. Kenny, 
Civil No. 79-2038 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 2, 1979) (illegal campaign contributions exchanged for 
promise of extending Cook Island postage stamp distribution contract); United States v. 
Carver, Civil No. 79-1768 (S.D. Fla. filed May 1, 1979) (bribed oil director of Qatar to obtain 
oil concession). 
304. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 
(1962); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979); 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1l 70,600, 
at 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1l 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
But see Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949, 954 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (acts done at direction of Japanese government are not insulated from pros-
ecution or civil responsibility when done in U.S. commerce), aff'd sub nom. Japan Line, Ltd. 
v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969). Only once, 
however, did a court actually sustain this defense on the facts before it. See Interamerican 
Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970) (defendants refused 
to sell Venezuelan crude oil to plaintiff's refinery on orders from the Venezuelan 
government). 
305. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1338-42 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 833 (1979) ; United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 82-84 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 818 (1976); United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 277-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 
U.S. 982 (1973); United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 401-02 (2d Cir. 1966). 
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form the act in question.306 Obviously, no one is required by law to 
bribe government officials. Moreover, the Justice Department con-
tends that the defense is available only when the order of compul-
sion is lawful in the country where made. 307 This would not be the 
case when a foreign official extorts a bribe. 
Unfortunately, the only court to confront this issue contradicts 
the Justice Department's view. In Interamerican Refining Corp. v. 
Texaco Maracaibo, Inc.,808 the United States District Court for the 
District of Delaware accepted the compulsion defense despite the 
plaintiff's contention that the Venezuelan government orders in-
structing the defendants to boycott it were invalid under Venezue-
lan law. 309 The court stated that the act of state doctrine precluded 
it from passing on the validity of the orders.310 Without challeng-
ing the court's decision on the facts before it, the claim of technical 
invalidity in I nteramerican Refining is distinguishable from the 
blatant illegality of extorting a bribe. A court need not explore the 
formal prerequisites for official action under foreign law-an in-
306. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 419(1)(b) 
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). · 
307. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div., Antitrust Guide for International Operations 
52, 55 (1977). In addition, the Justice Department apparently considers the defense unavail-
able if the foreign government acts in a commercial rather than public capacity when impos-
ing the compulsion. ld. at 55. If accepted by the courts, this distinction would preclude the 
sovereign compulsion excuse in cases involving procurement contracts and access to 
resources. 
308. Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 
1970). 
309. Id. at 1298. This claim was based upon the fact that the government orders were not 
in writing or published in the official gazette. Id. In Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page 
Airways, 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981), the court ap-
proved the following jury instruction: 
However, before you may consider this as evidence of any or all of the foregoing 
antitrust violations you must find: (1) This foreign commercial bribery is not an 
accepted industry practice in the foreign market and is not illegal under the law 
of that foreign country which defendants must prove to you by a preponderance 
of the evidence and (2) it was not compelled by a foreign government official 
which defendants must prove by a preponderance of the evidence. By "com-
pelled" I mean that the "foreign bribe" is a cost of doing business in the particu-
lar country and failure to make the payments results in the competitor inevita-
bly losing the business. 
Id. at 1360 n.27. The jury found for the plaintiff, however, and thus the court of appeals did 
not specifically consider whether this instruction was too generous to the defendant. 
310. Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. at 1298-99. Inter-
american Refining also appears to contradict the Justice Department's view regarding com-
pulsion by a foreign government acting in a commercial capacity. The court upheld the 
defense despite the fact the orders involved the sale of oil. Id. 
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quiry which admittedly raises justiciability problems311-to deter-
mine that a government official lacks authority to commit 
extortion. 
The policies behind the sovereign compulsion defense apply im-
perfectly, if at all, to extortion of a bribe. Three concerns underlie 
the defense: the problem of comity raised when two nations at-
tempt to compel contradictory conduct, the unfairness to a defend-
ant caught in the middle, and the possibility that compelling com-
pliance with U.S. antitrust laws at the cost of disobeying foreign 
law could eliminate rather than enhance competition.312 Comity, 
however, does not require deference to the action of a foreign offi-
cial which is clearly in violation of his own law. Indeed, the oppo-
site approach may better serve the interests of comity. In addition, 
there is no unfairness to the defendant or loss of competition if the 
company could have exposed the extortion to higher authority. 
Thus, only when resistance to the demand is completely impossible 
should the courts even consider a sovereign compulsion defense 
based upon extortion. 
Assuming that the courts recognize a co.mpulsion defen~e when 
the defendant could not challenge the extortionate demand, the 
defense should still not apply when the bribe prejudices competi-
tors. In order for the defense to apply, there must be an adequate 
degree of compulsion. 313 A finding of adequate compulsion depends 
upon three interrelated factors. The first is the extent to which the 
extortion truly springs from the government official's unilateral de-
mand rather than the defendant's suggestion. Courts repeatedly 
hold that the defense is unavailable if the defendant procured the 
order.n' The next factor is the degree of insistence with which the 
official makes the demand. Courts distinguish between mere ap-
311. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 415 n.17 (1964). 
312. 1 J. Atwood & K. Brewster, supra note 137, § 8.18, at 265-66; see also Interamerican 
Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. at 1298 (holding that anticompetitive 
practices compelled by foreign nations are not restraints of commerce, as the term is under-
stood in the Sherman Act, because refusal to comply would put an end to commerce). 
313. See, · e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 606-07 (9th Cir. 1976). 
314. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 606-07 (9th Cir. 1976); 
Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291, 1297 (D. Del. 1970); 
United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 96 N.M. 155, 186-87, 629 P.2d 231, 262-63 
(1980), appeal dismissed, 451 U.S. 901 (1981); cf. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 
592-93 (1976) (in the federal/state context, the compulsion defense depends upon proof that 
the state's command was in no way conditioned by "private" conduct). 
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proval, or even requests, and actual requirements imposed upon 
the defendant.3111 The final factor is the penalty for non-compli-
ance. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States (Revised) takes the position that the defense is only availa-
ble when criminal or other severe sanctions accompany the re-
quirement. 316 Such sanctions include the termination of valuable 
business arrangements, but not, according to the Restatement, de-
nying the opportunity for new arrangements.317 
Combining these factors, the defendant might prove adequate 
compulsion when, for example, it paid the bribe in response to 
threats of action against its business, such as expropriation or 
other harassment. In these situations, however, the payoff does not 
prejudice competitors. On the other hand, when the defendant 
uses the bribe to gain a competitive advantage-e.g., when an offi-
cial indicates that a government contract, access to resources, or 
regulation which handicaps a competitor might be available for a 
315. See, e.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 
(1962); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293 (3d Cir. 1979); 
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 606-07 (9th Cir. 1976); United 
States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 70,600, 
at 77,456-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 
1965). But see United States v. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), 1969 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 72,742, at 
86,647-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (consent decree did not apply to conspiratorial business acts done 
in pursuit of foreign power's "request or official pronouncement of poiicy" if non-compliance 
would result in loss of business). 
316. Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) § 419 com-
ment c (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1982). 
317. Id. In support of this principle, reporter's note 3 cites United States v. First Nat'! 
City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968). Here, the Second Circuit held that the bank's re-
fusal to produce subpoenaed documents located at its branch in West Germany could be 
justified by criminal or non-criminal sanctions imposed by West German law, including loss 
of the bank's license. ld. at 901-02. The court held that loss of customers, however, was an 
insufficient excuse. ld. at 904. Other courts have been less demanding. In Associated Radio 
Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1030 (1981), 
the court of appeals approved a more lenient jury instruction. See supra note 309 (quotation 
of instruction). In United States v. Standard Oil Co. (N.J.), 1969 Trade Cas. (CCH) 11 72,742 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), a consent decree exempted acts 
[w]here the combination .. . is participated in by Jersey pursuant to request or 
official pronouncement of policy of the foreign nation or nations within which 
the transactions which are the subject of such combination take place, or of any 
supranational authority having jurisdiction over such transactions within such 
nation or nations, and where failure to comply with which request or policy 
would expose Jersey to the risk of the present or future loss of the particular 
business in such foreign nation or nations which is the subject of such request or 
policy. 
Id. at 86,648. Neither of these two courts, however, squarely faced the issue. The plaintiff 
prevailed in the former case and the latter suit involved a consent judgment. 
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price-the defendant should not be able to show adequate compul-
sion. This is particularly true under the Restatement criteria where 
loss of new business is not a sufficient penalty. 
These distinctions are consistent with domestic criminal law and 
the FCPA. Under the leading federal cases, a claim that a United 
States or local official extorted the payment is not a defense to a 
bribery prosecution unless the pressure exerted is so overpowering 
as to negate the willful intent necessary for conviction. 318 This 
means that the official must threaten serious economic harm,319 the 
briber must be unable to report the demand to higher authority,320 
and the economic harm must involve deprivation of something to 
which the defendant is entitled rather than denial of discretionary 
action. 321 Under these criteria, particularly the last, loss of a pro-
spective contract does not provide the basis for an extortion de-
fense. The legislative history of the FCP A draws a parallel distinc-
tion for determining when extortion negates the required element 
that the U.S. company "corruptly" make the payment to a foreign 
official. 322 As a result, in any situation where the compulsion de-
fense exists for a foreign business, U.S. nationals are also free to 
make the payment without violating the FCPA. Conversely, if the 
FCPA prohibits a U.S. firm from paying an official, the compulsion 
defense should not apply. 
318. See, e.g., United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 278 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 
982 (1973); United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 401-02 (2d Cir. 1966). But compare 
United States v. Colacurcio, 659 F.2d 684, 690 (5th Cir. 1981) (refused to recognize any 
extortion defense), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1002 (1982) and N.Y. Penal Law§ 200.05 (McKin-
ney 1975) (extortion is an absolute defense). 
319. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1339-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 401-02 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. 
denied, 396 U.S. 832 (1969). · 
320. See, e.g., United States v. Bertman, 686 F.2d 772, 775 (9th Cir. 1982); United States 
v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1339 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979). 
321. See, e.g., United States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1339-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v. Peskin, 527 F.2d 71, 84 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 
429 u.s. 818 (1976). 
322. That the payment may have been first proposed by the recipient rather than 
the U.S. company does not alter the corrupt purpose on the part of the person 
paying the bribe. On the other hand true extortion situations would not be cov-
ered by this provision since a payment to an official to keep an oil rig from being 
dynamited should not be held to be made with the requisite corrupt purpose. 
S. Rep. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1977 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. 
News 4098, 4108. 
1987] ANTITRUST 269 
D. The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine 
As a last resort, a defendant may invoke the Noerr-Pennington 
doctrine. This doctrine was named for two Supreme Court deci-
sions which held that solicitation of government action, even if in-
tended to restrain or eliminate competition, is normally not a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act. 323 The twin bases for the doctrine are 
the desire to preserve a free flow of information to representatives 
in a democracy and to avoid chilling first amendment rights. 324 
There are several reasons why the rule should not apply to bribery 
of foreign officials. 
First, it is questionable whether the rule applies to the solicita-
tion of foreign governments. Supreme Court decisions have equivo-
cated on this issue3211 and lower courts are split.326 The first amend-
ment rationale, however, does not apply overseas.327 Providing 
323. United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961). 
324. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 
(1972); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. at 137-38. 
325. In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927), the Justice Department 
alleged that the defendants gained a monopoly over sisal imports in large part by lobbying 
the Mexican and Yucatan governments to pass discriminatory legislation. ld. at 273-74. 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court upheld the complaint. ld. at 276. It must be noted, how-
ever, that Sisal Sales Corp. substantially preceded the Noerr decision. In Continental Ore 
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707-08 (1962), the Supreme Court 
found Noerr inapplicable because the defendants did not solicit Canadian government legis-
lation. This suggests that the doctrine might have been applicable if they had. Graziano, 
Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States Antitrust Law, 7 Va. J. 
Int'l L. 100, 132 (1967). 
326. Compare Laker Airways v. Pan American World Airways, 604 F. Supp. 280, 287 
(D.D.C. 1984) (dicta stating doctrine does not apply to the petitioning of foreign govern-
ments); Bulkferts Inc. v. Salatin Inc., 574 F. Supp. 6, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (same); Occidental 
Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 107-08 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (same), 
aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972) 
with Coastal States Mktg. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1366 (5th Cir. 1983) (petitioning immu-
nity applied to litigation brought in foreign courts); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1157 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (applying Noerr to lobbying United 
States and Japanese governments without discussion of foreign government issue), aff'd in 
part and rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. In re Japanese Electronic Prods. Antitrust 
Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Matsushita Elec. Indus. 
Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986); see also Associated Container Transp. 
(Austl.) Ltd. v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 60 n.10 (3d Cir. 1983) (left issue open); Indus-
trial lnv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 882 n.6 (5th Cir. 1982) (same), vacated, 
460 U.S. 1007, reaff'd per curiam on remand, 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
961 (1983); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 690 n.3 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (same). 
327. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 108 (C.D. Cal. 
1971), aff'd per curiam on other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 
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information to representatives in a democracy is also irrelevant to 
many foreign regimes. Even if the doctrine applies abroad, it is un-
certain whether it covers solicitation of commercial acts, such as a 
government procurement contract.328 Again, with conflicting guid-
ance from the Supreme Court, 329 lower courts are divided. 330 When 
a government entity acts as a consumer, however, there is little 
reason to treat a defendant differently simply because it transacts 
business with such an entity rather than a private party. Moreover, 
bribery of government officials falls within the "sham" exception 
(1972). 
328. Id. 
329. In Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962), the 
Supreme Court held the doctrine inapplicable because " [i]n this case, respondents' conduct 
is wholly dissimilar to that of the defendants in Noerr. Respondents were engaged in private 
commercial activity, no element of which involved seeking to procure the passage or enforce-
ment of laws." Id. at 707. In United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965), 
however, the defendants solicited the Secretary of Labor to establish a minimum wage for 
companies selling coal to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TV A). Id. at 660. They also lob-
bied the TVA to curtail spot market purchases. Such purchases were exempt from the mini-
mum wage requirement. Id. at 660-61. Thus, although these lobbying efforts were aimed at 
influencing governmental commercial acts of procurement, they were immunized from anti-
trust claims by the Noerr doctrine. Id. at 670. However, the efforts involved promoting a 
legislative policy decision of encouraging a minimum wage rather than simply choosing one 
supplier over another. See George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 424 F.2d 
25, 31-33 (1st Cir.) (distinguishirg Noerr-Pennington from merchants' efforts to influence 
the purchasing decisions of public officials acting under competitive bidding statutes), cert. 
denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970). 
330. Decisions holding or suggesting that the doctrine is inapplicable to commercial acts 
include Coastal States Mktg. v. Hunt, 694 F.2d 1358, 1365 (5th Cir. 1983); Federal Prescrip-
tion Serv. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 663 F.2d 253, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. de-
nied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1981); Kurek v. Pleasure 
Driveway & Park Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 592 n.lO (7th Cir. 1977), vacated, 435 U.S. 992, rein-
stated per curiam, 583 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090 (1979); Hecht v. 
Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); 
Sacramento Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 150, 440 
F.2d 1096, 1099 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971); Woods Exploration & Produc-
ing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d 1286, 1296-98 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 
404 U.S. 1047 (1972); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 424 F.2d 25, 33 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); City of Atlanta v. Ashland-Warren, Inc., 1982-1 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 64,527, at 72,928 (N.D. Ga. 1981); General Aircraft Corp. v. Air 
America, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3, 8 (D.D.C. 1979); Oahu Gas Serv. v. Pacific Resources, Inc., 460 
F. Supp. 1359, 1384-85 (D. Hawaii 1978). 
Contrary decisions include Greenwood Utils. Comm'n v. Mississippi Power Co., 751 F.2d 
1484, 1505 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 693 F.2d 84, 87-88 (9th 
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983); Household Goods Carriers' Bureau v. Terrell, 
452 F.2d 152, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1971); BusTop Shelters, Inc. v. Convenience & Safety Corp., 
521 F. Supp. 989, 996 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Reaemco, Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496 F. Supp. 
546, 556 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United States v. Johns-Manville Corp., 245 F. Supp. 74, 81-82 
(E.D. Pa. 1965). 
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to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. This exception excludes from 
coverage activities which do not fit the two purposes of the rule.3 31 
Courts have repeatedly stated that bribery is such an activity. 332 
V. CoNCLUSION 
This Article has endeavored to provide a roadmap for prosecut-
ing foreign companies committing bribery overseas to the prejudice 
of U.S. firms. Substantial authority indicates that overseas bribery 
to gain a competitive advantage can violate U.S. antitrust laws. 
The United States may prosecute these illegal activities, even 
when committed abroad by a foreign firm, when United States can 
gain personal jurisdiction over the foreign briber and when the 
bribes impede U.S. imports. Even when foreign governments are 
involved at either side of the bribe, neither sovereign immunity, 
the act of state doctrine, the sovereign compulsion defense, nor the 
Noerr-Pennington doctrine may shield the briber from 
prosecution. 
One final issue remains. Prosecuting foreign bribers under U.S. 
antitrust laws is likely to generate protests from their home coun-
tries. It is difficult to see any justification for such complaints. The 
home country does not tolerate such conduct directed at its offi-
cials or occurring within its borders. To say that the nation where 
331. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 516 
(1972) (defendants' attempt to bar plaintiffs from adjudicatory processes is unprotected by 
Noerr because defendants were not exercising their constitutional rights to petition the 
government). 
332. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 
(1972); In re Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litig., 693 F.2d 84, 85 n.1 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. 
denied, 462 U.S. 1133 (1983); Federal Prescription Serv. v. American Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 
663 F.2d 253, 263 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 928 (1982); Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling 
Nelson & Sons, 351 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); 
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680, 686, 690 n.3 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Huron Valley Hosp. v. City of Pontiac, 466 F. Supp. 1301, 1313 (E.D. Mich. 
1979), vacated on other grounds, 666 F.2d 1029 (6th Cir. 1981); see also Sacramento Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 150, 440 F.2d 1096, 1099 
(9th Cir.) (Noerr-Pennington does not protect efforts to influence government through ille-
gal means, including threats and other coercive measures) , cert. denied, 404 U.S. 826 (1971). 
But see BusTop Shelters v. Convenience & Safety Corp. , 521 F. Supp. 989, 993, 996 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (campaign contributions did not bring case within sham exception); Cow 
Palace, Ltd. v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696, 703 n.4, 704 (D. Colo. 
1975) (bribes made without ulterior purpose to harm competition did not bring case within 
sham exception); cf. Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 350, 358 
(N.D. Ill. 1974) (campaign contributions came within Noerr-Pennington absent allegations 
of corruption), aff'd, 516 F.2d 220 (7th Cir. 1975). 
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the payoff occurs should be the one to impose any sanction is 
merely to hope that corruption will preclude enforcement. Most 
important, however, is that if prosecution under the U.S. antitrust 
laws offends the briber's home country, this is all for the better. It 
could create some incentive for other trading nations to join m 
multilateral treaties prohibiting bribery in international trade. 
